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Predominant theories of cognition have previously emphasized the modularity of 
processing, in which individual isolated modules process information free from the 
influence of other types of information.  However, more recent theories suggest that 
cognition is much more linked to motor and sensory processes than modular theories 
suggest.  In this dissertation, I outline the history of these two approaches in language 
processing and review recent evidence in favor of the central role of modality specific 
information in language comprehension. This review suggests that motor 
representations and actions can influence language processing in predictable ways. 
Next, I present new data to address some of the outstanding questions raised by the 
embodied perspective.  Chapter 3 investigates the developmental changes of embodied 
cue use, presenting new data from sentence-processing in five-year-old children.  
Chapter 4 investigates the interaction of subtle grammatical information, specifically 
verbal aspect, with motor information.  Taken together, the chapters of this 
dissertation suggest that, while many questions remain unanswered, the embodied 
cognition approach contributes to our understanding of language processing. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW 
Do language and action influence one another?  If so, what is the nature of this 
interaction? Is language processed in isolation, only sharing completely processed 
information with action areas of the brain?  Or do language and action influence one 
another continuously, such that action does not simply execute a completed command 
from language processing? The goal of my dissertation is to investigate and begin 
providing answers to these types of questions.    
Research between the 1950’s and the 1990’s was dominated by modular views 
of cognition. In this framework, symbols processed within the cognitive system are 
both amodal and arbitrary (as described in Barsalou, 1999).  Similarly, the modular 
view of cognition implies that information is processed in an isolated and encapsulated 
fashion. Only when these encapsulated processors have completed their operations do 
they share their outputs with other encapsulated processors. Specifically, modular 
theories of cognition hypothesize that language is processed in dedicated language 
modules, free from the influence of other sources of information.  Only when these 
language modules have completed their processing do they share this information with 
other areas of the brain.  Hence, modular views of cognition call for separate 
processing of different types of information (Fodor, 1975; Pylyshyn, 1984).  
According to these theories, language and action may interact, but only after each 
module has completely finished its own processing.   
Despite the predominance and power of these theories, there is a great deal of 
evidence in support of more interactive approaches.  Take, for example, the well-
known McGurk effect (McGurk & MacDonald, 1976).  In this experiment, 
participants saw a face repeating the syllable “ga” while simultaneously hearing the 
syllable “ba” via an auditory stream.  Despite the fact that the auditory information 
 2 
unambiguously supports the perception of “ba,” participants reported perceiving the 
syllable “da.” Although the auditory input supports “ba,” the visual input of the lips 
remaining open is incongruous with this perception.  The best fit for the auditory and 
visual stimuli then is “da”. Extending this work by digitally altering faces and sound 
files along the “bah-dah” continuum, Massaro (1999) provided evidence that the 
visual perception of the speaker’s mouth had an immediate and graded effect on which 
of the two phonemes was reported. Hence, visual information significantly alters 
participant’s perception of auditory information.  
Importantly, this interaction is bi-directional.  Not only does visual information 
alter auditory perception, but also auditory stimuli influence the perception of visual 
information. For example, when a single flash of light is accompanied by two auditory 
beeps, the visual flash is often perceived as two flashes of light (Shams, Kamitani, & 
Shimojo, 2000). Moreover, auditory information influences the perception of a 
dynamic motion event.  When a leftward-moving disk and a rightward-moving disk 
are animated on a computer screen so that they pass each other on slightly different 
depth planes, participants perceive the event as the disks passing by each other.  
However, if a simple 2.5 millisecond auditory click is delivered at the point of visual 
coincidence, observers more often perceive this same dynamic visual event as the two 
disks bouncing off each other and reversing their directions of movement (Sekuler, 
Sekuler, and Lau, 1997).  These results then indicate that auditory stimuli also 
influence the perception of visual information.   
While these examples of interactions are exciting, they only speak to the 
interactions between so called “lower-levels” of perceptual processing. That is, such 
research provides evidence for interactions between perceptual modalities, but does 
not speak to how such low-level information participates in so-called “higher-levels” 
of cognitive processing.  To answer these types of questions, a great deal of recent 
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empirical evidence suggests that perceptual and motor simulations are automatically 
and unconsciously engaged while performing higher-level cognitive tasks, like 
language comprehension.  These theories of embodied cognition contend that 
interactions between an organism and its environment facilitate cognitive abilities 
generally (Barsalou, 1999; Calvo-Merino, Grezes, Glaser, Passingham, & Haggard, 
2006; Thelen & Smith, 1994; Zwaan, R.A., 2004), reminiscent of Gibson’s (1979) 
approach.  
Gibson (1979) proposed that a sensory analysis of the world generates not a 
copy of the world’s structure but a pragmatic mapping onto the action opportunities 
the world’s structure makes available.  He called these pragmatic mappings 
affordances and suggested that the process of decision-making underlying voluntary 
behavior is, at least in part, selecting from these pragmatic representations of motor 
options.  Because one of these will be selected and released into overt execution, this 
process should be somewhat embedded within the neural systems associated with 
motor control.  
Expanding on Gibson’s theory, embodied cognition claims that the cognitive 
abilities of an organism are grounded in an organism’s experiences in the world.  
Specifically, higher-levels of cognitive processing, like language, should necessarily 
rely on perceptual and motor groundings in the environment. Hence, embodied 
cognition researchers suggest that language comprehension is perceptually and 
motorically grounded (Barsalou, 1999; Langacker, 1987). 
Despite many recent advances in our understanding of embodied cognition and 
in how language and action interact, many questions still remain.  In each of the 
following chapters, I will investigate some of these outstanding questions.  Chapter 2 
reviews both historical and more recent data in support of interactions between 
language and action.  These results, as a whole, suggest that language not only 
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influences motor output, but action also influences language processing.  Chapter 3 
investigates changes in sentence processing across developmental time.  These results 
suggest that children are like adults in that comprehending syntactically ambiguous 
sentences results in graded spatial differences in motor output.  Unlike adults, the 
results demonstrate that children do not use the same types of visual cues to 
disambiguate these sentences.  Chapter 4 looks at the way subtle temporal differences 
in language manifest in continuous motor output.  Whereas other research has focused 
on sentence comprehension and word processing interactions with motor output, these 
data explore the way verbal aspect interacts with visual scene information, impacting 
continuous motor output.  Chapter 5 outlines and discusses outstanding questions that 
need to be addressed to more fully understand the interactions between language and 
motor processing.   
Chapter 2 
Do language and action interact?  If so, what is the nature of this interaction?  This 
chapter reviews research regarding these questions. As introduced here, many long-
standing predominant theories of cognition have viewed higher levels of processing, 
such as language and cognition, as free from the influence of lower levels of 
processing, such as action and perception. However, many recent experiments have 
found evidence that the delineation between traditional modules is not so clean or 
precise, with motor output and language comprehension interacting much more fluidly 
than traditional theories predict.  Evidence for this account includes findings of 
systematic activation of motor cortex while processing action words, as well as 
functional consequences of language on action and of action on language. It is worth 
noting that this recent spate of interest in the embodiment of cognition is not without 
historical precedence.  Chapter 2 reviews such evidence coming from previous 
decades of research on the interaction between language and action, in addition to 
 5 
exploring the empirical results of more recent experiments and methodologies.  It 
seems that motor representations and actions can influence language processing in 
predictable ways.  Not only is there continuous competition between simultaneously 
active alternatives in language processing, with multiple sources of information 
interacting immediately, this competition is apparent in the motor output produced as a 
response to language.    
Chapter 3 
Does children’s sentence processing influence their motor output in a similar way to 
what is observed in adult sentence processing performance? Do children rely on the 
same non-linguistic sources of information as adults rely on when processing 
sentences?  What predicts the transition from child- to more adult-like sentence 
processing skills? 
Prior research suggests that while adults use information from the visual scene 
to disambiguate garden-path sentences (i.e., Put the apple on the towel in the box), 
children do not. However, the nature of these differences between children’s and 
adults’ sentence processing skills is unclear. One possible mechanism for this 
transition is linguistic experience: children with greater linguistic experience, and 
correspondingly higher vocabulary scores, may be better able to utilize scene-based 
cues in processing structurally complex sentences.  Here, the continuous and non-
ballistic properties of computer mouse movements   are used to investigate how young 
children incorporate multiple sources of information.  Participants heard structurally 
ambiguous sentences while viewing scenes with properties that did or did not support 
the less frequent noun phrase modifier interpretation.  As previously reported 
(Snedeker & Trueswell, 2004; Trueswell, Sekerina, Hill, & Logrip, 1999), children 
have difficulty in utilizing scene-based context cues, especially in the two-referent, 
ambiguous sentence condition. However, vocabulary scores significantly predicted 
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performance in this condition.  Children with higher vocabulary scores, and 
presumably greater linguistic experience, were better able to move the appropriate 
referent to the correct destination in the two-referent, ambiguous sentence context.  
Using the results from a novel behavioral testing method combined with a measure of 
linguistic experience, the data suggest that linguistic experience is one mechanism 
underlying the development of syntactic processing skill.  
Chapter 4  
How is subtle temporal information about a verb, specifically verbal aspect, 
processed?  Does this influence motor output in systematic ways? 
How does grammatical aspect influence the understanding of everyday motion 
events? Research shows processing differences between the past progressive (e.g., was 
walking) and the simple past (e.g., walked), but details about the temporal dynamics 
remain unexplored. The current work uses computer-mouse tracking (Spivey, 
Grosjean, & Knoblich, 2005) to explore the processing of aspect.  In Experiment 1, 
participants heard motion descriptions in the past progressive or simple past while 
viewing a scene with a path that terminated at a destination, and placed a character in 
the scene to match the descriptions. Overall, the past progressive sentences yielded 
slower movement durations, suggesting differences in information made prominent by 
the different aspectual forms.  Experiment 2 expanded these results by examining past 
tense and future tense situations (will walk, will be walking). Experiment 3 further 
expanded the results of Experiment 1 by examining the interaction of contextual 
descriptions and verbal aspect in past tense situations. Together, these experiments 
provide new insights into the role of aspect in event understanding, demonstrating that 
perceptual simulation occurs in systematic and predictable ways at the level of 
grammar. 
Chapter 5 
 7 
What is the overall significance of this program of research? What questions remain to 
be answered?  This chapter will outline the contributions of this research before 
turning to the questions this research raises.  Specifically, I will address previous 
concerns regarding the mouse-tracking methodology as a reliable index of continuous 
cognitive decisions leaking into continuous motor output.  Similarly, I will suggest 
future directions for research to investigate the nature of the relationship between 
motor and language tasks.   
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CHAPTER 2 
THE ENACTMENT OF LANGUAGE: DECADES OF INTERACTION BETWEEN 
LINGUISTIC AND MOTOR PROCESSES1 
 
"The world shows up through the enactment of the perceptuomotor regularities." 
        -Francisco Varela 
 
Many long-standing theories of cognition have assumed that higher levels of cognition 
are amodal and modular (Dietrich & Markman, 2003; Fodor, 1975; Frazier & Clifton, 
1996; Frazier & Fodor, 1978; Pylyshyn, 1984).  In such theories, cognitive processes, 
such as language and action, are handled in two separate systems, each working 
according to its own principles.  Under this view, symbols processed within the 
cognitive system are both amodal and arbitrary because their content bears no 
systematic relationship to the original sensory processes that gave rise to them (see 
Barsalou, 1999b, for review and critique). These theories have dominated cognitive 
science for decades because they are quite powerful in their ability to account for 
representations of types and tokens, combine symbols productively, and represent 
abstract concepts (Fodor, 1975; Pylyshyn, 1984).   
While such explanations are quite clean and powerful, evidence against such a 
modular view of cognition has been accruing for some time.  One such example comes 
from a recent compelling case, worthy of showcasing at the beginning of this review, 
which illustrates the representational entanglement between motor movement and 
cognition via a series of fMRI experiments involving dancers. Calvo-Merino and 
colleagues (2006) exploited the fact that within classical ballet there are movements 
                                                 
1 Published as: Anderson, S.E. & Spivey, M.J. (2009).  The enactment of language: Decades of 
interactions between linguistic and motor processes.  Language and Cognition, 1, 87-112. 
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that are typically only performed by women (pointe work, for example) and 
movements that are typically only performed by men (cabriole, or jumping into the air 
and beating the calves, for example).  The researchers used these gender-specific steps 
to investigate whether participants would exhibit different patterns of brain activity 
when viewing such movements. When dancers passively watched stereotypically male 
ballet steps, greater premotor, parietal, and cerebral activity, including the mirror 
neuron system, was observed in the male dancers compared to their female 
counterparts.  Similarly, when the dancers watched stereotypically female ballet steps, 
greater premotor, parietal, and cerebral activity was observed in the female dancers 
compared to the male ballet dancers. These results suggest that the brain activity of 
someone simply watching a movement they have mastered is dramatically different 
from the brain activity of someone who watches these movements everyday (so they 
are equally familiar) but who does not perform them herself. This implies that the 
neural circuits involved in purely motor responses are involved in recognition, over 
and above visual representations, suggesting that we understand actions not only by 
visual recognition, but also through activation of brain areas associated with motor 
activity.  Traditional encapsulated theories of cognition, which assume clean 
separations between different modules, do not predict different patterns of motor 
cortex activation, based on experience, in such visual recognition tasks.   
Simple motor output has been shown to influence recall of memories as well.  
First, it was demonstrated that having participants smile and stand in an upright 
position facilitates the retrieval of pleasant memories, while having participants slump 
and make downcast expressions facilitates the retrieval of unpleasant memories 
(Riskind, 1983).  These results suggest that both facial expression and posture 
facilitate recall information associated with autobiographical memories that have 
emotional valence.  These results have recently been expanded to demonstrate that 
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posture in general can facilitate the retrieval of non-valenced memories as well.  
Dijkstra, Kaschak, and Zwaan (2006) asked young and older adult participants to 
assume postures congruent with or incongruent with childhood events.  Therefore, 
participants who experienced a congruent condition were asked to lie down while 
recalling their first visit to a dentist, while participants experiencing the incongruent 
condition were asked to lie down while they recalled opening the door for a visitor.  
Participants in the congruent condition recalled these autobiographical events with 
significantly shorter response times than did participants in the incongruent condition.  
Additionally, free recall of these events after two weeks was also better for 
participants in a congruent posture than in an incongruent posture.  These results 
provide compelling evidence that posture and motor processes influence the retrieval 
of memories when the memory is retrieved in a laboratory setting and after a lag of 
two weeks.  Again, traditional theories of encapsulated cognition would not predict an 
influence of motor activity on memory retrieval, instead suggesting that memory is 
modular and free from the influences of motor activity created simply by postural 
differences. 
In light of such evidence against traditional views of cognition, more recent 
theories of cognition suggest a continuous interaction between so called higher and 
lower levels of cognition.  These theories of embodied cognition contend that 
interactions between an organism and its environment facilitate cognitive abilities 
generally (Barsalou, 1999b; Calvo-Merino, Grezes, Glaser, Passingham, & Haggard, 
2006; Thelen & Smith, 1994; Zwaan, 2004).  In other words, embodied cognition 
claims that the cognitive abilities of an organism are grounded in an organism’s 
sensorimotor experiences in the world. Demonstrating fluid interactions between these 
processes, which were once viewed as removed from one another, blurs the 
delineation imposed by modularity of traditional cognitive theories. Also, embodied 
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theories suggest a role for low-level processes, like action, on high-level processes, 
like language. 
While a great deal of attention has recently been paid to theories that 
incorporate motor movements and action into their account of language and cognition, 
it is certainly not a new idea.  In the history of psychology, there is a great deal of 
empirical support for this interaction.  Despite being somewhat downplayed during the 
cognitive revolution and its ascendancy, evidence from earlier decades steadily set the 
stage for the interaction of language and action that recent research has turned into a 
cottage industry. Here, we will review just some of these early findings for the 
interaction of language and action that laid this foundation, before turning our 
attention to some more recent research in the field. 
A history of support 
Although a great deal of research between the 1950’s and the 1990’s was dominated 
by modular views of cognition, interest in theories of embodied cognition have 
increased rapidly over the course of the last decade.  However, these embodied 
theories are by no means without precedent.  Approaches in philosophy predating 
psychology were dominated by this interaction of mind and body, even from as far 
back Aristotle and Epicurus (for review, see Barsalou, 1999b).  These classical 
approaches in philosophy viewed the representations underlying thought as naturally 
and necessarily tied to perceptual processes.  However, with the cognitive revolution 
of the mid-twentieth century, this view was swept aside by theories proposing more 
encapsulated views of cognition, in areas from visual imagery to sentence processing.  
Even as the zeitgeist of the cognitive revolution rolled into many areas of cognitive 
research, evidence for a more interactive approach was almost secretly being obtained. 
Evidence during the height of the Cognitive Revolution 
Despite the prevailing trend at the time for treating cognition as something 
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independent of perception and action (e.g., Neisser, 1967; Newell, Shaw, & Simon, 
1958), several notable experiments from that time provide evidence for a more 
interactive account. Predominant modular accounts of cognition predict that so called 
higher levels of processing, like language, should be encapsulated from perception and 
action, such as the spatial reference implied by a word.  Hence, perceived location of a 
visual stimulus should not influence language processing.  On the other hand, more 
interactive approaches would predict a functionally important interface between 
processing a word and its spatial reference in the world.  Under this view, the 
perceived location of a visual stimulus may be influenced by comprehending a word, 
with the spatial reference necessary to comprehend the word interfering with the 
perception of the visual stimulus’s location.  In order to explore this, Kaden, Wapner, 
and Werner (1955) found that subjective eye level is influenced by the spatial 
components of words. While subjects sat in a dark room, they saw luminescent words 
at their objective eye level, and were asked to then move these words up or down, 
until they were at their subjective eye level. Words with an upward connotation 
('climbing', 'rising') were placed slightly lower than objective eye level to be perceived 
as being at eye level; on the other hand, words with a downward component ('falling', 
'plunging') were placed slightly above the objective eye level.  Hence, it seemed that 
words were not as free from the influence of spatial perceptual reference frames as 
would be expected from the predominant symbol-processing theories of the time.  
Almost ten years later, evidence for embodied sensorimotor priming in 
problem solving emerged from an experiment investigating individual differences in 
functional fixedness.  Glucksberg (1964) studied people’s actions while attempting to 
solve Duncker’s (1945) candle-mounting problem. In this task, participants were given 
a box of tacks, a candle, and a matchbook, and then asked to mount the candle on the 
wall using only the items available on the table.  While many people struggled with 
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the problem for some time, those who did arrive at the correct answer (using the tacks 
to mount the box itself onto the wall as a sconce for the candle) reported a moment at 
which the answer seemed to “pop” into their head.  When watching a participant’s 
actions, Glucksberg found that participants who successfully solved the problem 
happened to accidentally touch the box a greater number of times than participants 
who failed to solve the problem.  This suggests that before the moment the answer 
seems to pop into the participant’s head, she is paying a little extra attention to the 
item on the table that can afford solving the problem.  This kind of perceptual-motor 
priming suggests that even incidental touching of the full box of tacks may facilitate 
the insight of using the box itself as the wall mount. 
 In the 1970’s, while amodal theories continued to dominate the field, some 
researchers were exploring more interactive approaches to cognition.  Notable 
exceptions to the amodal trend include Greenwald's (1970) ideomotor theory, which 
proposed that the performance of a voluntary action is mediated by an image of the 
action's sensory feedback, and Neisser's (1976) proposal that cognition is actually the 
result of Perception-Action Cycles.  Theories such as these sought to link  “lower 
levels” of perception and action to “higher levels” of cognition and thinking more 
seamlessly. Another notable exception to the amodal theories of the time is the work 
of Gibson (1979), who proposed that a sensory analysis of the world generates not a 
copy of the world’s structure but a pragmatic mapping onto the action opportunities 
the world’s structure makes available.  He called these pragmatic mappings 
affordances and suggested that the process of decision-making underlying voluntary 
behavior is, at least in part, selecting from these pragmatic alternatives of motor 
actions made available by the dynamic kinematic relationship between organism and 
environment. 
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Affordances in vision and language  
More recently, the role of affordances in object identification has been explored. It 
seems that physical properties of an object that determine how that object can be 
manually interacted with, or its micro- affordances, may influence object identification 
(Ellis & Tucker, 2000; Tucker & Ellis, 1998).  In these experiments, participants were 
asked to make simple perceptual judgments regarding whether an object was right-
side-up or upside-down.  The reaction times for this judgment were influenced by 
whether the handle of the object was on the left or right side and which hand was used 
for responding.  The response times were slightly faster when the hand responding 
was the same hand that would interact with the handle of the object, as indicated by 
which side of the object the handle was on – despite the fact that these were two-
dimensional images of objects on a computer screen, and thus never availed actual 
affordances. Therefore, it seems that part of recognizing an object, without being 
asked to interact or even having the opportunity to interact with it, involves at least 
partial activation of the motor actions needed to interact with it.  Hence, to some 
degree, object identification is tied to the actions required for interacting with that 
object. 
 Affordances also influence the processing of temporarily ambiguous sentences.  
When a participant hears a sentence such as “Pour the egg in the bowl over the flour,” 
he or she will experience the garden path effect (Chambers, Tanenhaus, & Magnuson, 
2004).   This sentence is temporarily ambiguous because the prepositional phrase “in 
the bowl” could either attach to the noun phrase, describing which egg to pour (less 
preferred), or to the verb phrase, describing where to pour the egg (more preferred).  
Since the less preferred option is the ultimately correct one, readers should experience 
the garden path effect, reflected by either inflated reading times or an increased 
proportion of looks to a second (irrelevant) bowl, when they encounter the 
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disambiguating information “in the bowl.”   
 Chambers and colleagues (2004) varied the affordances of the objects in the 
visual scene.  Hence, the visual workspace corresponding to the example sentence 
“Pour the egg in the bowl on the flour” would either contain one or two eggs in liquid, 
or pour-able, form.  If the visual scene only contained one candidate referent that 
could accomplish the task (one egg in pour-able form and the other still in the shell), 
then participants initially misinterpreted the first prepositional phrase, “in the bowl’, as 
the goal location for the pouring action, since there was only one egg that afforded 
pouring and thus it needed no further specification.  Therefore, they incorrectly 
attached the prepositional phrase to the verb.  However, if the visual scene contained 
two action-affording candidate referents (two eggs in pour-able form, one in a bowl 
and the other in a transparent cup), then participants did not initially attach the first 
prepositional phrase to the verb.  Instead, they correctly used the first prepositional 
phrase to distinguish between the two plausible referents for the pouring action and 
did not experience the garden-path effect.  These results provide evidence both for 
interactive and continuous processing in sentences and for the important role of 
affordances in this aspect of sentence comprehension, as would naturally fall out of 
the earlier theories of Neisser (1976) and Gibson (1979). 
The beginnings of a cottage industry  
In the early 1990’s, evidence for interactions between action and language began to 
accumulate rapidly.  As findings emerged to suggest that language processing was 
more continuous and interactive than assumed by amodal symbol-processing theories, 
the putative barriers between modular areas in the brain created through carving up 
cognition began to break down.  Not only were multiple sources of linguistic 
information contributing immediately to language processing at the level of phoneme 
(Elman & McClelland, 1988), word (Allopenna, Magnuson, & Tanenhaus, 1998) and 
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sentence (Tanenhaus & Trueswell, 1995; Trueswell, Tanenhaus, & Kello, 1993), but 
non-linguistic cues were also able to influence early processing.  Cues from the visual 
scene were shown to influence early syntactic decisions (Snedeker & Trueswell, 2004; 
Spivey, Tanenhaus, Eberhard, & Sedivy, 2002; Tanenhaus, Spivey-Knowlton, 
Eberhard, & Sedivy, 1995; Trueswell, Sekerina, Hill, & Logrip, 1999), thus further 
blurring the line between subsystems that had been thought of as isolated and 
independent from one another.  As a result, an interaction between action and 
language comprehension no longer seemed so far fetched.   
During this time, several researchers provided evidence for sensorimotor 
components underlying cognitive representations. Klatzky and colleagues (Klatzky, 
Pellegrino, McCloskey, & Lederman, 1993) showed that people have explicit 
knowledge about how to manipulate and grasp objects. In one experiment, participants 
were told to rate different actions on six dimensions: portion of limb moved, distance 
moved, forcefulness, effectors involved, size of the contact surface, and resemblance 
to grasp. Participants’ ratings were systematic, mainly relying on factors related to 
limb movement and effector (usually the hand) configuration. In a second experiment, 
the researchers found results from sorting tasks indicating the six motor-haptic 
dimensions used in the first experiment contributed to similarity judgments. The 
results support the existence of cognitively accessible, but still relatively specific, 
representations of functional actions. These results provide a relatively early 
demonstration of how people's cognitive representations contain sensorimotor 
components. 
 Also, before the early 90’s, much of the research investigating human 
cognition viewed action as trivial, suggesting that the motor system is simply a slave 
of higher-level cognition, such as language processing and problem solving, and that 
the motor system merely executes a discrete and fully completed command that is 
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delivered from these “higher levels” of processing.  However, in investigating the 
differences in online processing, evidence suggests that factors influencing latency to 
respond also influence later aspects of response dynamics. In a lexical decision task, 
Abrams and Balota (1991) had participants make rapid limb movements in opposite 
directions in order to indicate whether a string of letters was a word or not.  As 
expected, they found that the frequency of the word influenced the speed of reaction 
time, with high frequency words being responded to more quickly than low frequency 
words.  In addition, they showed that word frequency also influenced response 
kinematics after the response was initiated, specifically finding that responses to high 
frequency words were more forceful than responses to low frequency words. These 
findings suggest that word frequency not only influenced the time required to 
recognize a word, but also influenced the subsequent response dynamics, implying 
that the response system is not slavishly executing a complete command regarding the 
status of the word. In a later experiment, they found that high-frequency words are 
also responded to with greater acceleration than low frequency words (Balota & 
Abrams, 1995).  They found a consistent pattern of results in a memory scanning 
paradigm, where both onset latency and response dynamics after the response was 
initiated were influenced by the memory set size and by the presence of the probe 
word (Abrams & Balota, 1991). These results make a compelling case for looking at 
both reaction time and other response variables from motor output, including 
acceleration and force of movement, after a movement to respond is initiated.  
In the second half of that decade, the number of experiments investigating 
interactions between language and motor action exploded.  With the work of 
researchers like Barsalou (1999a, 1999b), Pulvermuller (1999), and Glenberg (1997), 
it seemed that the ideas of earlier researchers like Neisser (1976) and Gibson (1979) 
were finally coming to fruition. The discovery of mirror neurons in 1996 (Rizzolatti, 
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Fadiga, Gallese, & Fogassi, 1996) played no small part in fueling this increase.  Mirror 
neurons are neural structures that are active when a monkey either observes or 
performs certain motor activities (Rizzolatti, et al., 1996), and these findings have also 
been extended to humans via neuroimaging (e.g., Buccino, et al., 2001; Stevens, 
Fonlupt, Shiffrar, & Decety, 2000). Prompted by the discovery of mirror neurons, the 
momentum of the resurgence of embodied theories of cognition in mainstream 
cognitive psychology was increased yet again. 
 Barsalou  (1999b) provided a contemporary theoretical framework within 
which to view the interaction of perception and action with cognition.  For example, 
rather than viewing a concept as a list of features that have been extracted away from 
the original perceptual experience of that object, Barsalou described how perceptual 
simulations can capture the object from perception.  Specifically, he postulated that 
when an object is visually perceived, neurons in the visual system fire in response to 
features of that object.  Neurons in nearby associative areas then conjoin the active 
visual features’ firing responses in memory so that later, when the object is not 
physically present, the conjunctive neurons partially reactivate the original set of 
feature detectors that were active when the object was perceived.  This approach 
allows that these simulations are not complete and may be biased, but also suggests 
that these perceptually grounded simulations are enough to support memory, language, 
and thought, bypassing the need for redundant conceptual representations in the brain 
(Barsalou, Simmons, Barbey, & Wilson, 2003). 
 Further evidence for the grounding of language in lower levels of processing 
came from research comparing performance of participants who were expressly told to 
use imagery in order to list features of a concept verbally to that of participants who 
were simply asked to list features (Barsalou, Solomon, & Wu, 1999).  Amodal 
symbol-processing theories assume that differences should arise between the two 
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groups, with participants who are told to use imagery to create the list engaging modal 
simulations while the non-imagery participants rely on the default amodal simulations.  
On the other hand, modal embodied accounts of cognition hypothesize that no 
differences should arise as a result of the different instructions: modal imagery is the 
default method for creating such lists.  Indeed, the data supported the second 
hypothesis.  Both groups produced comparable distributions of complex features, and 
similar regression equations were able to account for reaction times when members of 
each group were asked to verify properties of a concept.  These results taken together 
make a strong case for the role of lower levels of processing on cognition. 
 Also during this time, the role of action was not only applied to adult cognition 
but also to that of young infants (Smith, Thelen, Titzer, & McLin, 1999; Thelen, 
Schoener, Scheier, & Smith, 2001).  In one such study, an experimenter hid a toy 
under one container while a nine-month old participant watched, and then the infant 
was given an opportunity to retrieve the toy (Thelen, et al., 2001).  The infant was able 
to do this correctly and would continue to successfully retrieve the toy on successive 
trials as long as the toy continued to be hidden under the same container.  After 
multiple trials, though, if the experimenter then hid the toy under a second container, 
the child would persist in reaching to the container that the toy had been hidden under 
in previous trials, even though he or she had seen that the toy was no longer there.  
 The results of the A not B task were originally interpreted as a discontinuity of 
cognitive development in children, with children not being able to inhibit the response 
that had become salient in the previous trials, even though they have seen that this 
option was no longer the correct one.  Piaget suggested that progress from one stage of 
development to another is precipitated by something disrupting the stability of the 
current pattern of behaviors associated with that stage (Piaget, 1952).  If the shift from 
a current stable set of behaviors to another is caused by disrupting the stability of the 
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current behaviors, then what creates the disruption? In the context of the A not B task, 
the inability to inhibit an inappropriate response was originally thought to be due to 
differences in maturational rates in possible dual systems of perception and action 
(Ahmed & Ruffman, 1998; Bertenthal, 1996).   However, Thelen and colleagues 
(2001) found that making a slight adjustment to the child’s reaching motion eliminate 
the erroneous action. By placing a weight on the baby’s arm right before he or she 
moved to retrieve the toy from the new hiding place, the child was able to reach to the 
correct container and retrieve the toy successfully, thus acting like older children.  
Changing the biomechanics of the situation was sufficient to disrupt the reaching 
pattern that had become stable during subsequent trials and allow the child to retrieve 
the toy from the correct hiding place.  These results suggest that the child’s experience 
and motor movements through the world had become tied to retrieving the toy in this 
experimental situation. The change was not simply one of a maturation of cognitive 
control influencing the ability to inhibit a salient response, and developing in a 
discontinuous step-like manner.  Changing the immediate biomechanics of the child 
by attaching a weight to the arm prior to reaching to the new hiding location allowed 
the young children to successfully complete the task.   
 Grant and Spivey (2003) provided evidence that motor movements of the eye 
made to relevant aspects of a visual scene can influence problem solving.  One such 
example comes from a recent extension of Duncker’s (1945) radiation problem.  In 
this problem, participants were asked how to cure a person with an inoperable stomach 
tumor using lasers, which destroy the surrounding tissue if applied at sufficient 
intensity to kill the tumor.  In addition to the word problem, participants are provided a 
diagram depicting the tumor, the healthy tissue, and the skin separating the stomach 
from the outside.  The answer is that the lasers need to be fired from multiple locations 
outside the healthy tissue so that they converge on the tumor, thereby applying 
 21 
sufficient intensity to the tumor but leaving the healthy surrounding tissue unharmed. 
Grant and Spivey (2003), using eye-tracking, found that just before participants solved 
the problem successfully, they made a number of fixations on the stomach lining.  
This finding suggested that attention to this particular visual feature influenced 
successful answering of the problem.  Further supporting this inference, in a second 
experiment, they found that by highlighting these relevant visual areas, participants 
were more likely to arrive at the correct answer.  They conclude from this that making 
relevant aspects of the visual display more visually salient drew visual attention to 
these regions and made solving the problem more likely, with eye movements helping 
to coordinate spatial locations in the visual field with internally represented elements 
of the mental model (e.g., Spivey & Geng, 2001). The movement of the eyes to the 
relevant aspects of the scene assisted in building the appropriate representation 
necessary to solve the problem (see also Thomas & Lleras, 2007). 
Recent behavioral evidence for the interaction of language and action 
While the 90’s saw a surge in evidence to support the interaction of language and 
action, the past eight years have continued this trend.  The body of literature in support 
of an interaction between language and action has continued to grow as more 
encapsulated views of language have been called into question.  The next point to 
explore, beyond whether or not there is an interaction, is how this interaction occurs.  
However, the exact nature of this interaction has been largely unexplored (for review, 
see Fischer & Zwaan, 2008; Zwaan & Taylor, 2006).   If language and motor actions 
do interact fluidly, then there should be evidence of facilitation (or in some cases 
inhibition) when processing language and executing motor movements that rely on the 
same underlying neural architecture.   
 Evidence for the motor underpinnings of language, using both neuroimaging 
techniques and behavioral experiments, have made great strides in beginning to 
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answer these questions.  In relation to action words, similar patterns of activation are 
found in motor and pre-motor cortex in perceiving an action word and in performing 
that action (Hauk & Pulvermuller, 2004; Pulvermuller, 1999; Pulvermuller, 2001; 
Tettamanti, Buccino, Saccuman, Gallese, Danna, Scifo, Fazio, Rizzolatti, Cappa & 
Perani, 2005).  One such experiment investigated how activity in the left temporal lobe 
differed when the participant heard an action word or performed the action.  While in 
the fMRI scanner, participants passively read sentences containing action words 
associated with different parts of the body or performed actions associated with those 
same parts of the body.  When performing these actions, pre-motor and motor cortex 
show a topographical arrangement of activation, with activity involving the face 
located in one area, and with activity involving the feet located in another area, etc.  
Interestingly, and most importantly here, when participants were passively reading 
words about actions involving the face (kiss), arm (pick), and leg (kick), the brain 
activity overlapped with parts of motor cortex associated with actually performing the 
actions (Hauk, Johnsrude, & Pulvermuller, 2004).  In a follow-up experiment, these 
results were expanded to demonstrate that the activity in motor cortex is available 
early in processing (Hauk & Pulvermuller, 2005).  By exploring the time course of the 
spread of activity in motor cortex during word processing, it seems that this firing is 
not simply a by-product of the comprehension process that happens further down 
stream from processing the word.  Instead, this information is immediately available to 
influence word comprehension.  These results taken together indicate not merely a 
“spreading activation” from linguistic representations to motor representations, but 
also suggest a functional role for neural feedback from motor areas to language 
comprehension. Further, these results suggest that the brain basis for action words is 
grounded in transcortical cell assemblies (Hebb, 1968) that are distributed across 
language areas and motor areas.   
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Influence of language on action  
To investigate the behavioral consequences of these polymodal neuronal ensembles, 
Boulenger and collegues (Boulenger, Roy, Paulignan, Deprez, Jeannerod, & Nazir, 
2006) explored the effect of processing action words on the response dynamics of a 
reaching movement.  In one experiment, participants moved their dominant hand from 
a central location when a fixation cross appeared.  Upon moving the hand from this 
home pad, either a word or a pseudoword replaced the fixation cross.  If the letter 
string was a word, participants were instructed to continue the hand movement and 
grasp a cylinder located away from the home-pad, but if the letter string was a 
pseudoword, they were required to return to the home-pad. The procedure of the 
second experiment was identical, except that the letter string was presented in place of 
the fixation cross before initiation of hand movement, thus serving as the go-signal.  In 
this way, the experimenters were able to investigate the relative impact of the 
movement both during and after word comprehension.  The results showed that when 
the words appeared after the onset of the movement, the comprehension process 
seemed to interfere with the reaching movement.  Specifically, the latency to reach to 
the cylinder was longer, and the amplitude of the wrist acceleration was smaller when 
the word that appeared after the movement had been initiated was a verb than when it 
was a noun.  However, when the word appeared as the go-signal itself, the verbs, but 
not the nouns or the pseudowords, seemed to facilitate the response, with the peak 
wrist acceleration appearing earlier.  These results suggest that processing action 
words recruits the cortical regions also involved in programming and executing 
motion.  Hence, the action words, but not concrete nouns, interfered with overt motor 
behavior when the two tasks were performed simultaneously, but facilitated the same 
overt motor behavior when the lexical decision task came first.   
 In a follow up experiment, these findings were extended to show that even 
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after the movement had been initiated, the reaching motion is disturbed by the visual 
presentation of a verb (Nazir, Boulenger, Roy, Silber, Jeannerod, & Paulignagn, 
2007).  When an action verb was visually presented at either 50ms or 200ms after the 
movement to reach the cylinder was initiated, the motor output was disrupted, 
resulting in greater deceleration rates when the presented word was a verb than when 
it was a noun. In the first experiment, peak wrist acceleration (which occurred between 
160 and 177 ms after the word was presented) showed interference from the action 
word when the word was presented as movement was initiated (Boulenger, et al., 
2006).  Here, when the word was presented either 50 or 200 ms after the movement 
was initiated, the interference of the action word manifested itself in deceleration 
peaks of the reaching movement, presumably because peak wrist acceleration happens 
too early to reflect motor perturbations initiated at these longer intervals (Nazir, et al., 
2007). The results of these two experiments taken together suggest that the cross-talk 
between language processing and movement execution does not simply occur after a 
constant interval; such cross-talk appears to manifest itself differentially over the 
course of motor programming and the movement itself.    
 There is also evidence to suggest that comprehension of a whole sentence 
implying movement interferes with motor output (Glenberg & Kashak, 2002).  In a 
series of experiments, participants were asked to judge whether or not sentences made 
sense by making a movement away or towards themselves.  For example, after reading 
a sentence such as “Jay rolled the marble to you,” participants were asked, in one 
condition, to move their hand from a central fixed location towards themselves to 
indicate that the sentence made sense; but if a participant read a sentence such as “Jay 
swept the beach bum now,” they were asked to move their hand away from themselves 
and the central location to indicate that the sentence did not make sense.  The results 
of these experiments showed that when participants read sentences that implied 
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direction, reaction times to respond that the sentence made sense were significantly 
shorter when the movement they were required to make matched the direction of 
motion implied by the sentence.  Therefore, a participant would be quicker to respond 
“yes” if they moved toward themselves (matched direction) to indicate the sentence 
“Jay rolled the marble to you” made sense than if they were required to move away 
from themselves (mismatched direction).  The pattern of results across this series of 
experiments provides evidence that the action implied by an entire sentence facilitated 
movements that were compatible with the verbal description.   
  Similar effects showing differences in motor output as modulated by 
differences in language input have been demonstrated in the investigation of eye 
movements and fictive motion sentences.  Fictive motion sentences are sentences that 
contain an action verb but no actual movement or action takes place.  For example, 
“The road ran through the valley” contains the action verb ran, but the road is not 
actually performing the act of running, or any action at all. Participants heard a context 
sentence describing the terrain, and then a target sentence containing fictive motion. 
When participants first heard context sentences describing the terrain as difficult, 
inspection times and eye-movement scanning along the path were increased (as though 
a hint of actual motion was being perceptually simulated), compared to when 
participants heard the terrain described as easy (Richardson & Matlock, 2007). These 
results support earlier reaction time results, in which participants read narratives 
describing a terrain, and then made decisions about whether a fictive motion sentence 
was related to the preceding context (Matlock, 2004).  Participants were slower to 
respond to fictive motion sentences when they had read context sentences describing 
slow travel, long distances, or difficult terrain, than when the they had read context 
sentences describing fast travel, short distances, or easy terrain. However, no such 
differences in context descriptions were found when the target sentence did not 
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contain fictive motion.  Taken together, these results provide evidence that fictive 
motion descriptions affect both reaction times and eye movements by evoking mental 
representations of motion, and that this is then influenced by descriptions of that 
motion.  The eye-movement data allows for a closer look at the way the constructed 
mental model and the linguistic description are coordinated.     
Influence of motor movement on language 
 The next question is one of bi-directionality: does behavioral action influence 
language processing similar to the way language influences action? It may be possible 
to reconcile findings supporting language’s influence on action by claiming that 
language is central, but activation in language areas spread to supplementary areas, 
such as motor areas, giving rise to these results. In other words, it could be the case 
that the language system does process information separately from other systems, but 
that this information then spreads into motor output.  Therefore, parts of the brain 
associated with language are central to language processing, and activity in motor 
areas is simply peripheral and redundant. Following this line of argumentation, despite 
evidence from neuroimaging studies and behavioral studies suggesting language’s 
influence on action, these effects may not be indicative of a meaningful interaction 
between the two levels of processing. Determining whether action is central to 
language processing then requires bi-directional influence between action and 
language processing.  
 One way of exploring this issue is to create temporary and reversible changes 
in an otherwise healthy brain through transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS), and 
then observe the differences in language processing.  If activation of motor areas is 
peripheral to language processing, then there should be no observed differences 
between processing action words associated with different areas when these motor 
areas are disrupted by TMS.  On the other hand, if TMS does influence results of 
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language processing, then this would provide evidence that these motor areas are not 
peripheral or epiphenomenal to language processing, but are indeed functionally 
integrated with it.  Pulvermüller and colleagues (Pulvermüller, Hauk, Nikulin, & 
Ilmoniemi, 2005) explored this hypothesis by applying TMS to motor areas while 
subjects made lexical decisions on action related words.  TMS of hand and leg areas 
influenced the reaction time to arm and leg words differentially. Action words related 
to the arms (“fold,” “grasp,” and “write,” for example) were responded to more 
quickly than leg action words when arm motor areas were subjected to TMS.  
Similarly, action words related to the legs (“run,” “walk,” and “step,” for example) 
were responded to more quickly than action words related to the arms when the leg 
motor areas were subjected to TMS. By demonstrating that motor activity influences 
language processing in a category specific manner, this evidence suggests a functional 
and non-peripheral role for motor activity in the processing of language related to 
action words.    
 Motor output also influences language production in surprising ways. The fact 
that people gesture as they speak can be observed anywhere two people are having a 
conversation, although the degree to which individuals gesture may depend on a 
number of different factors.  In order to more formally investigate the communicative 
value of gestures, Casasanto and Lozano (2007) devised a series of experiments.  In 
the first experiment, participants were videotaped as they told a confederate a story 
using either literal spatial language, which described movement of physical objects 
either upward, downward, right or left (the rocket went higher), metaphorical spatial 
language, which described non-spatial events that are often expressed using spatial 
descriptions (my grades went higher), and non-spatial language stories, which 
contained no spatial language (my grades got better). They found that in all cases, the 
overwhelming majority of gestures were in the same direction as the implied 
 28 
metaphor, critically including the non-spatial descriptions (“My grades got better,” 
accompanied by an upward gesture).  This suggests that the participants were using 
spatio-motor representations to convey information, even when that information was 
not spatial in nature.   
 However, it was unclear whether these gestures were for the benefit of the 
listener (in order to help convey the story) or for the benefit of the speaker (using 
spatio-motor representations in order to bolster concrete and abstract spatial language).  
By having participants hold down a button while they told their stories, thus 
preventing gesturing, a significantly greater number of verbal disfluencies were found 
compared to the condition in which participants were able to freely gesture.  Because 
these findings could be the result of performing two tasks, that of holding down a 
button and speaking, Casasanto and Lozano (2007) conducted a third experiment.  In 
this experiment, participants were asked to move balls from one container to another: 
either from left to right, right to left, up to down, or down to up.  As they moved the 
balls, they were instructed to tell a story that included all four types of movement.  
Participants created many fewer verbal disfluencies when performing the task of 
moving the balls in a direction that was congruent with that part of the story than when 
they were moving the balls in a direction that was incongruent with that part of the 
story.  These results suggest that the gesture, even when it was an arbitrary movement 
the participant was required to make throughout the session, facilitated verbal fluency 
in telling the parts of the story congruent with that movement.  Thus, in conjunction 
with Pulvermüller and colleagues’ (Pulvermüller, Hauk, Nikulin, & Ilmoniemi, 2005) 
evidence that neural activity in motor areas can influence lexical decision tasks for 
verbs that involve the corresponding limbs, Casasanto and Lozano’s findings support 
the conclusion that motor actions are an active part of cognitive functions of both 
literal and metaphorical language use and support the hypothesis that motor 
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movements do influence linguistic processing.   
Toward a continuity among language and action  
The fluid bi-directional interaction between motor processes and language processes is 
particularly evident when looking at the millisecond-by-millisecond timing of 
information integration during language comprehension.  One area in which the 
continuous competition between multiple, partially activated representations can map 
onto continuous motor output comes from research in lexical decision tasks.  Just as 
sentences may have temporary ambiguities because of their incremental nature, the 
same is true for words.  As a word unfolds over time, it is ambiguous with other words 
that share similar sounding onsets (Marlsen-Wilson, 1987; Zwitserlood, 1989).  For a 
brief period after the onset of a word, all words beginning with the same acoustic-
phonetic input show partial activation. As more acousti-phonetic input is received, the 
target word is further identified, and some words drop out of the cohort (the set of 
words with similar sounding onsets).  For example, the acoustic-phonetic input for the 
words candy and candor is more overlapping than the acoustic-phonetic input for 
candy and cable.  Hence, candy would be differentiated from candor after a longer 
period of time than it would from cable, since candy and candor share more overlap 
and become unique further into each word.  Likewise, when presented with a target 
word candy, cable would drop from the cohort faster than candor.  Therefore, it seems 
that lexical decisions are based on a competition between multiple, partially active 
candidate words.  Recent eye-tracking and reach-tracking work has investigated how 
these multiple competing candidates appear to continuously map onto multiple 
competing motor response options. 
 As a spoken word unfolds over time and exhibits temporary ambiguity, a 
second potential referent in the visual scene illustrates the dynamic competition 
between the two possibilities. Tanenhaus and colleagues used such a visual scene to 
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investigate the processing of phonetically similar words (e.g., Allopenna, Magnuson, 
& Tanenhaus, 1998; Eberhard, Spivey-Knowlton, Sedivy, & Tanenhaus, 1995).  
Participants heard auditory commands such as “Pick up the candy.”  When the visual 
scene only contained a single possible referent (for example a piece of candy, a fork, a 
pincushion, and a pair of scissors), the eyes moved straight to the correct referent, the 
candy.  In fact, the speed with which the eyes arrived at the appropriate location meant 
that the saccadic motor program had been initiated before the word was finished.  
However, when the pincushion was replaced with a phonologically similar item, such 
as a candle, a different pattern of results emerged.  The participants looked to 
something else in the visual scene on about a third of the trials, and on about two-
thirds of these trials, that something was the phonological competitor, the candle.  The 
competition between the two possible referents, due to their overlapping phonological 
similarity, was played out in the eye movements (see Gold & Shadlen, 2000, for 
related evidence of multiple competing oculomotor signals).  
 Further evidence for this continuous accrual of lexical evidence cascading 
directly into a continuous accrual of motor response activations comes from reaching 
tasks.  For example, Spivey and colleagues used computer-mouse movements to track 
continuous responses in investigating this task (Spivey, Grosjean, & Knoblich, 2005). 
Participants were presented with an auditory instruction such as “Click on the candy” 
and asked to use a computer mouse to click on the corresponding picture. In the visual 
scene on the computer screen, participants either saw pictures of two items that were 
phonologically similar, such as a piece of candy and a candle, or they saw pictures of 
two items that were not phonologically similar, such as a piece of candy and a ladle.   
During the movement of the mouse to click on the corresponding picture, the 
continuous streaming x, y coordinates of the mouse as it moved with the goal-directed 
hand motion to click on the appropriate object were recorded, and the competition 
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between the partially activated lexical alternatives was revealed in the shape and 
curvature of the hand-movement trajectories.  When the pictures showed items that 
were not phonologically similar, the average trajectories of the mouse-movement 
trajectories moved in a relatively straight path to the appropriate object.  However, 
when the pictured objects had phonologically similar names, each individual 
trajectory, as well as the overall average trajectory, showed some graded spatial 
attraction to the competing object with the phonologically similar name.  As the 
partially active lexical representations competed over time, that continuous 
competition was reflected in the smooth curve of the motor output. 
 Indeed, evidence from cognitive neuroscience supports the necessary claim of 
competing underlying motor commands to produce this smooth motor output. One 
experiment investigated this question using multi-cell recordings.  By presenting 
monkeys with two potential reaching actions and recording from dorsal premotor 
cortex, Cisek and Kalaska (2005) provide evidence that two populations of neurons - 
each corresponding to a reach toward one of the two targets - respond simultaneously 
in preparation for a reach to either targets.   
 The task began with the monkey moving a cursor to a central green circle, 
which was then followed by red and blue cue circles that appeared at two of eight 
possible target locations surrounding the start location, usually opposite from one 
another.  Next, the color cues disappeared, and the central circle changed color to red 
or blue, indicating which of the two memorized color coded spatial cue locations was 
the target.  After this central color cue disappeared, green circles appeared at all eight 
peripheral locations.  The trial ended when the monkey moved the cursor to the correct 
location.  This task was compared to performance in a one-target task, which was 
similar to the two-target task except that only one cue circle appeared and only one 
movement direction was specified.  
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 By making the color cue centrally located, the task did not encourage or 
require that two movements be simultaneous specified prior to the onset of the actual 
reaching motion.  In other words, the monkeys could have waited until they were 
given the central cue indicating which target to move toward to begin motor planning, 
selecting only one target. However, the experimenters found evidence that when the 
monkeys faced two potential reaching targets, two separate directional signals 
reflecting both options arose in dorsal premotor cortex.  When new information was 
given to select one of the targets, then the corresponding directional signal increased 
while the other decreased. These results support the hypothesis that at least two motor 
commands can be prepared until sufficient information is provided to allow one of 
them win the competition.  When one of the two becomes more salient, it wins the 
right to be executed and ramps up, while the other command gradually dies off.   
 Tipper, Howard, and Houghton (2000) developed an account based on neural 
ensembles for how irrelevant visual stimuli can influence overt motor output in 
reaching motions, describing the effect of this competition process on the motor 
program that is launched into execution.  In their description, competing and 
overlapping population codes, representing different actions, are activated in response 
to visual stimuli. Because the codes overlap, inhibition of the irrelevant population 
code must occur, but this does not mean that the overlap of population codes does not 
influence the motor program that is executed.   Due to the overlap, the movement that 
is ultimately executed is influenced by competition from the population code readied 
to respond to the irrelevant stimulus.  Therefore, trajectories of the hand movement to 
the correct stimulus deviate toward the incorrect stimulus.  Also, the degree of the 
deviation toward the irrelevant stimulus is influenced by how salient the distracter is.  
Hence, if a distracter is particularly salient, the degree of deviation toward the 
distracter will be greater than if the distracter is less salient.   
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 Therefore, arm movements seem to be a competitive, dynamic process, with 
the result of this process being curves in trajectories toward distracters.  When these 
stimuli are close together in the environment, the influence of the distracter is greater 
than if they are farther away, resulting in greater curvature of the hand toward the 
distracter (Houghton & Tipper, 1996).  When one of the two potential motor 
commands wins, the other is suppressed via lateral inhibition (Meegan & Tipper, 
1998).  This inhibition of nearby locations successfully suppresses the competing 
action, but shifts the population distribution in such a way to cause trajectories of hand 
movements to curve toward the distracter item (Houghton and Tipper, 1996).  This 
evidence converges to suggest that the competition between two underlying motor 
commands produces a smooth, curving arm movement.   
Conclusion 
This paper has attempted to review relevant data for the interaction of action and 
language processing through the years.  During the cognitive revolution, most 
empirical language research focused on the encapsulation of language from lower 
levels of processing.  However, even during this time, evidence for an interaction 
between language and action was occasionally being reported.  As the prevalence of 
these modular theories decreased, the corresponding number of investigations into this 
interaction increased.   
 More recent research suggests that cortical areas devoted to motor planning 
and execution play a role in language processing.  Not only are some of these neural 
architectures shared, language seems to influence execution of motor commands, and 
execution of a motor command seems to influence language comprehension.  
However, this does not imply that the basis of lexical access to a word is based only in 
the motor cortical areas of the brain.  The evidence provided here suggests that motor 
planning is involved with language processing, but of course many other brain areas 
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are also involved.  While motor planning is implicated in the process, it would be 
ridiculous to suggest that it is solely responsible.  After all, people who cannot scuba 
dive or ride a horse can still talk about these events.   
In addition to such unanswered questions about the exact functional role of 
motor cortex in language comprehension, there are unanswered questions about the 
embodied approach more broadly.  For example, there is evidence to suggest that 
effects like those reported here can be detached from the physical body, casting doubt 
onto how situated these systems really are.  For example, Chen and Bargh (1999) 
demonstrated that participants are quicker to pull a lever to respond to a word if that 
word is positively valenced than if it is negatively valenced.  On the other hand, 
people are quicker to respond to a negative word than to a positive word if they have 
to push a lever to do so.  This is in keeping with theories of embodied cognition, 
suggesting that pulling movements toward the body are more associated with positive 
objects, and pushing actions are more associated with pushing negative objects away 
from the body (Caciopoo, Priester, & Bernston, 1993; Chen & Bargh, 1999).   
However, recent evidence shows that these preferences can be altered by representing 
the “self” outside of the body, for instance by labeling a box with a participant’s name 
on a computer screen (Markman & Brendl, 2005). Here, when participants were 
shown a box labeled with their name in a hallway on the computer screen, participants 
were faster to push in response to positive words if their labeled box was far away on 
the screen.  Therefore, participants were more likely to perform an action that was 
typically associated with negative words if that motion resulted in their virtual-self 
pulling.  Theories of embodied cognition are not yet developed enough to explicitly 
account for such results, where the self can be represented so freely outside of the 
actual physical body.   
 Despite such unanswered questions, by providing evidence that action and 
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perception influence language processing, we gain a richer understanding of how 
dynamic the process of language comprehension really is.  Instead of treating language 
as a process of logical rules operating on amodal symbols, and transitioning from one 
static state to another, the majority of experimental findings support a view of 
language wherein the linguistic representations are coextensive with sensorimotor 
representations and change continuously in time. Thus, rather than focusing overmuch 
on the rare and impressive feats of cognition that only humans can accomplish (such 
as mental arithmetic and formulating chess strategies), a great deal of progress in 
understanding the mind can be achieved by focusing on the ubiquitous ordinary feats 
of perception-action cycles (such as engaging in interactive conversations that 
integrate visual and linguistic cues), behavior that philosophers are now calling 
“everyday coping”.  
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CHAPTER 3 
INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES IN MEASURES OF LINGUISTIC EXPERIENCE 
ACCOUNT FOR VARIABILITY IN THE SENTENCE PROCESSING SKILL OF 
FIVE-YEAR-OLDS2 
 
Over the past fifteen to twenty years, a great deal of evidence has accrued in support 
of the notion that when a sentence is heard or read, the adult language comprehension 
system rapidly accesses many different sources of linguistic and/or non-linguistic 
information in pursuit of extracting structure and meaning from the signal (e. g. 
Altmann & Steedman, 1988; MacDonald, Pearlmutter, & Seidenberg, 1994; Snedeker 
& Trueswell, 2004; Tanenhaus, Spivey-Knowlton, Eberhard, & Sedivy, 1995; 
Trueswell, Tanenhaus, & Garnsey, 1994). Until recently, however, a lack of child-
appropriate behavioral techniques has hindered the study of young children’s on-line 
syntactic processing and development. Here, we consider whether non-linguistic cues 
facilitate the comprehension of syntactically ambiguous sentences in children, present 
data from a new technique to support previous findings from the children’s sentence 
processing literature, and explore the role of individual differences in linguistic 
experience in facilitating the transition to more adult-like sentence processing. 
 In order to study on-line language comprehension, researchers often present 
adult subjects with syntactically ambiguous sentences and then examine the sources of 
information that influence the manner in which these sentences are initially 
interpreted.  Take, for example, the two following sentences.   
1a) Put the apple on the towel in the box. 
     1b) Put the apple that’s on the towel in the box. 
                                                 
2 In press: Anderson, S.E., Farmer, T.A., Goldstein, M., Schwade, J., & Spivey, M. (in press). 
Individual differences in measures of linguistic experience account for variability in the sentence 
processing skill of five-year-olds.  In I. Arnon & E.V. Clark (Eds.), How children make linguistic 
generalizations: Experience and variation in first language acquisition. Trends in Language 
Acquisition Research: John Benjamins Publishing Company. 
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In example (1a), the prepositional phrase (PP) on the towel creates a temporary 
syntactic ambiguity in that it can be initially interpreted as a destination (or Goal) for 
the referring expression the apple, thus attaching to the verb phrase  (VP-Attachment).  
Alternatively, the PP on the towel could be interpreted as a modifier of the noun 
phrase (NP), such as Put [the apple on the towel] in the box (NP-attachment).  
 Referential context is a non-linguistic cue that has been shown to influence how 
adults initially attach an ambiguous PP. When participants hear ambiguous sentences 
like (1a) in the presence of visual scenes where only one referent is present (an apple 
already on a towel), along with an incorrect destination (an empty towel), and a 
correct destination (a box), adults often look to the incorrect destination until the 
second disambiguating PP is heard, at which time eye-movements tend to be re-
directed to the correct destination (Tanenhaus et al., 1995; Trueswell, Sekerina, Hill, 
& Logrip, 1999). Looks to the incorrect destination indicate “garden-pathing,” or, 
initially incorrectly attaching the PP to the verb phrase.  Looks to the incorrect 
destination do not occur when the instruction is unambiguous as in (1b).   
 The looking patterns are, however, markedly different when the visual context 
contains two possible referents (e.g., an apple on a towel and another apple on a 
napkin). When hearing an ambiguous sentence like (1a) in a “two-referent” visual 
context, adults tend to look at the correct referent (the apple on the towel) and move it 
to the correct destination with few looks to the incorrect destination. In accordance 
with various instantiations of referential theory (Altmann & Steedman, 1988; Spivey 
& Tanenhaus, 1998), when two possible referents are present, an expectation is 
created that the two similar entities will be discriminated, thereby forcing a modifier 
interpretation of the initial PP (NP-attachment). 
 While adults use visual context to resolve temporary ambiguities with less 
 38 
common but correct interpretations of sentences, children do not immediately use the 
visual context to disambiguate temporarily ambiguous sentences in the same way that 
adults do.  Regardless of the number of referents in the visual scene, children continue 
to garden-path when hearing an ambiguous sentence (Trueswell, et al., 1999). 
However, children behave similarly to adults in regard to another cue. Lexical biases, 
or the frequency with which a verb (like Put) takes a prepositional object (such as on 
the towel) in naturally occurring language, influence the degree to which adults and 
children experience a garden-path effect. When the lexical bias of a verb strongly 
supports VP-attachment, both adults and children prefer the VP-attached interpretation 
of the PP (Britt, 1994; Snedeker & Trueswell, 2004).  For example, when hearing a 
globally ambiguous sentence with a VP-attachment biased verb like “tickle,” e.g., 
“Tickle the pig with the fan,” both adult and child participants will pick up a fan 
provided in the visual display and use it to tickle a pig (VP-attachment) more often 
than tickling a second pig in the visual display holding a fan (NP-attachment), 
demonstrating a preference for resolving the ambiguity with VP-attachment.  If, 
however, a verb does not typically take a prepositional object, such as choose, which 
favors NP-attachment (Snedeker & Trueswell, 2004), children and adults prefer the 
NP-attached interpretation of the PP.  Therefore, in an example like, “Choose the cow 
with the stick,” participants attach the PP to the NP and pick up the cow holding the 
stick in the visual display (rather than using another stick present in the visual display 
to pick a second cow).  Unlike adults, however, the scene-based referential context 
does not interact with the lexical-bias of the verb in determining which interpretation 
children initially entertain. That is, although children show remarkable sensitivity to 
the biases of the verbs, context does not further facilitate children’s initial attachment 
preference (Snedeker & Trueswell, 2004).  
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However, under some experimental circumstances, children do seem to use 
referential context in an adult-like way.  For instance, when a child does not see a 
visual scene containing two referents until hearing the entire ambiguous sentence, she 
performs more like an adult in the two-referent, ambiguous-sentence condition (Crain 
& Meroni, 2002).  Thus, hearing an ambiguous sentence before seeing the visual scene 
may simplify the task, allowing the child to deal with the inputs one at a time and 
ultimately to incorporate the visual scene information into her comprehension of the 
sentence.  These results may imply that processing efficiency is linked to not only 
language comprehension (Fernald, Perfors, & Marchman, 2006; Hurtado, Marchman 
& Fernald, 2008; Marchman & Fernald, 2008), but also to the ability to use multiple 
cues during language comprehension.   
 Children are not adult-like in their sentence processing ability, but it is still 
unclear what mechanisms underlie such a transition from child- to adult-like sentence 
processing. Snedeker and Trueswell (2004) suggest that the sources of information 
that are most reliable in the input children receive, specifically the lexical bias of the 
ambiguity producing verb, are relied on more heavily than less reliable information, 
such as the referential context.  Such an explanation implies a role for linguistic 
experience: a child with greater linguistic experience may be more likely to have come 
across either more diverse examples of syntactic constructions or more examples of 
visual context as a reliable disambiguating cue.  As a result, a child with more 
linguistic experience may be more likely to behave in a more adult-like way in the 
two-referent, ambiguous condition that is typically most difficult for children 
(Snedeker & Trueswell, 2004; Trueswell, et. al, 1999).  
 Previous research supports this prediction, demonstrating that individual 
differences in linguistic input predict children’s mastery of more complex sentences 
(Huttenlocher, Vasilyeva, Cymerman, & Levine, 2002).  Specifically, individual 
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differences between children’s comprehension of multi-clause (more complex) 
sentences is related to the proportion of such multi-clause sentences they hear in 
parental speech.  Children whose parents use multi-clause sentences a greater 
proportion of the time have greater mastery of such sentences.  These data suggest that 
exposure to more complex syntactic input results in the child’s increased mastery of 
such syntactically complex sentences.  The present experiment aims to establish a 
more explicit link between individual differences in linguistic experience and more 
adult-like use of visual cue information in processing complex sentences. If exposure 
to the input is what drives the comprehension system toward adult-like behavior by 
differentially weighting the reliance on one or more sources of information as the 
databases for each cue grows via experience with language, children with more 
linguistic experience should have a more adult-like use of context than children with 
less linguistic experience. 
 In the adult literature, researchers use vocabulary scores to index linguistic 
experience (see MacDonald & Christiansen, 2002 for a discussion).  Similarly, child 
research suggests that vocabulary growth is related to the extent and diversity of 
linguistic experience, at least until the age of two-years-old (Hoff, 2003). These data 
suggest then that vocabulary scores are a reasonable approximation of linguistic 
experience, in that children with richer linguistic experiences also have 
correspondingly higher vocabulary scores.  More recent research demonstrates a link 
not only between early maternal input and later vocabulary size (Hurtado, et al., 2008), 
but also between vocabulary size and language processing efficiency (Fernald, et al., 
2006; Hurtado, et al., 2008; Marchman & Fernald, 2008). Eighteen-month-old 
children of parents who spoke relatively more often and produced relatively more 
complex constructions had correspondingly larger vocabularies at twenty-five months 
(Hurtado, et al., 2008; Fernald, et al., 2006) and at eight years of age (Marchman & 
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Fernald, 2008).  Also, children who heard more early input had greater processing 
speed in language comprehension tasks at a later age (Hurtado, et al., 2008).  Although 
there are likely many factors that drive the development of the system over time, 
previous research suggests that linguistic experience is a legitimate starting place for 
looking at these individual differences in sentence processing ability within a single 
age group.   
A new methodology for use with children 
Although the eye-tracking paradigm has provided invaluable child-performance data, 
the technique can be expensive, can involve slow hand-coding of data, and can 
sometimes incur parental objections. As a supplement to eye-tracking, research has 
demonstrated that monitoring the continuous nonlinear trajectories recorded from the 
streaming x, y coordinates of computer-mouse movements can serve as an indicator of 
the underlying cognitive processes in spoken word recognition (Spivey, Grosjean, & 
Knoblich, 2005), categorization (Dale, Kehoe, & Spivey, 2007), adult syntactic 
processing (Farmer, Anderson, & Spivey, 2007), and various higher-level social 
phenomena (Freeman, Ambady, Rule, & Johnson, 2008; Wojnowicz, Ferguson, Dale 
& Spivey, 2009). Unlike saccadic eye-movements, mouse movements are generally 
smooth, continuous, and can curve substantially mid-flight. This dense sampling 
methodology then allows graded spatial attractions to emerge within single trials. For 
example, although eye-movement data afford approximately 2-4 data points 
(saccades) per second, mouse-tracking yields somewhere between 30-60 data points 
per second, depending on the sampling rate of the software used. By recording the x,y 
coordinates of the mouse as it moved with the goal-directed hand motion to click on 
the appropriate object, smooth competition between the partially active underlying 
representations are revealed in the shape and curvature of the hand-movement 
trajectories. These properties of tracked mouse-movements provide crucial benefits in 
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that they allow a fine-grained and graded response pattern to emerge within an 
individual trial. 
Although children can use a computer mouse at 3.5 years, on average, and the 
onset of autonomous computer use is approximately 3.7 years (Calvert, Rideout, 
Woolard, Barr, and Strouse, 2005), the degree to which this cheap, portable, and 
accessible mouse-tracking methodology can be used to study complex cognitive 
phenomena in young children remains to be seen. Here, we exploit these mouse-
movement trajectories, in the visual-world paradigm (Tanenhaus et al., 1995), to 
determine its efficacy in detecting children’s processing differences in complex 
cognitive tasks. 
Purpose of the current experiment 
Here, we employed the mouse-tracking methodology to monitor the motor output of 
children as they moved objects around a natural scene in response to ambiguous (1a) 
and unambiguous (1b) spoken instructions. To hold the lexical-bias variable constant, 
sentences contained only the verb Put, which is strongly biased toward VP-attachment 
(for example, attaching the first PP “on the towel” to the verb “put” resulting in the 
garden-path effect). The computer mouse-movements made towards either target or 
distractor objects in the visual scene provide an index of what the child is attending to, 
moment to moment, as they interpret the utterance. Specifically, trajectories that veer 
towards the incorrect goal location while the correct object is picked up and moved to 
the ultimately correct location in the display indicate a garden-path effect, signaling 
some consideration of the VP-attachment.  
This is the first experiment to use the mouse-tracking methodology with 
children, and we predicted results similar to those of previous eye-tracking studies. In 
the one-referent context, we predicted significant curvature toward the ultimately 
incorrect destination for ambiguous sentences (1a), relative to the unambiguous 
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control condition (1b), signaling some consideration of VP-attachment. In the two-
referent context, we predicted that if mouse-movement data provide results similar to 
the eye-movement data elicited from children in previous studies (Trueswell et al., 
1999), then we would expect to detect significant ambiguous-sentence trajectory 
curvature toward the incorrect destination, relative to the unambiguous control 
condition. 
In addition to verifying that mouse-tracking is a suitable methodology for 
examining children’s comprehension of complex sentences, we also examined the role 
of linguistic experience on children’s performance in this task.  While previous 
research suggests that linguistic experience plays a crucial role in the transition from 
child- to adult-like sentence-comprehension (Snedeker & Trueswell, 2004), this is the 
first experiment to explicitly test such predictions within a single age group using 
individual differences in the visual world paradigm.  To examine the role of linguistic 
experience on children’s performance, children also completed a receptive vocabulary 
test.  As described above, we use vocabulary scores as a proxy for linguistic 
experience, predicting that children with higher vocabulary scores would have more 
adult-like use of context in the two-referent, ambiguous-sentence condition.    
Method 
Participants 
Forty-three participants, nineteen females and twenty-four males, between the ages of 
56 and 70 months old (M=63.38 months) participated in this experiment.  We 
recruited participants from the developmental lab’s birth announcement database and 
through the local school systems.  The children came from a mostly middle to upper 
middle SES background.  Each child received a small toy for participating. One 
additional child participated, but was excluded from the analysis due to refusal to 
participate in the mouse-tracking task. Twelve additional children were excluded from 
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the trajectory analysis because they produced too many incorrect mouse trajectories 
(see Data screening and coding for details). 
Materials and Procedure 
We adapted and digitally recorded sixteen experimental items from Spivey, 
Tanenhaus, Eberhard, & Sedivy (2002). We made each item “child-friendly” by 
substituting potentially unfamiliar objects with objects included in the MacArthur-
Bates Communicative Development Inventory, a widely used parental-report of 
productive vocabulary for children up to thirty months (Fenson, Dale, Reznick, Bates, 
Thal, & Pethick, 1994). We recorded ambiguous (1a) and unambiguous instructions 
(1b) that corresponded to each of sixteen experimental scenes (see Spivey, et al., 2002 
for details). We varied each of the visual scenes corresponding to the sixteen 
experimental items to produce a one-referent condition and a two-referent condition. 
The one-referent visual context (Figure 1, top) contained a target referent (e.g., an 
apple on a towel), an incorrect destination (e.g., a second towel), the correct 
destination (e.g., a box), and a distracter object (e.g., a flower). In the two-referent 
context (Figure 1,bottom), all items were the same except that we replaced the 
distracter with a second possible referent (such as an apple on a napkin).  We also 
created sixteen distracter scenes, designed to accompany the filler sentences, and these 
scenes used different combinations of the objects from the experimental trials and 
from a set of new, easily recognized objects. 
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Figure 1. Example of one- (top) and two- (bottom) referent displays shown to children. 
 A female adult, using age-appropriate child-directed speech, recorded the spoken 
instructions using the speech synthesizer program Audacity. Children sat at a child-
sized table in front of a computer monitor.  Macromedia Director MX presented the 
visual context and sound files on an Apple G4 computer. We used a small, portable 
mouse to collect mouse movements. A visual display containing all items associated 
with each auditorily-presented instruction appeared on the monitor. See Figure 1.  For 
each scene, at the beginning of the sound-file participants first heard “Place the arrow 
at the center of the cross.” Once the child moved the cursor to the center of the cross, 
an experimenter repositioned the mouse to the center of a small sticker on the table. 
This repositioning ensured that the mouse cursor always started in the same place for 
each trial and minimized the possibility that the participants would run out room to 
move the mouse on the table during each trial. Sound-files accompanying 
experimental scenes always played the experimental sentence first, followed by two 
additional filler instructions. Thus, for experimental items, participants viewed the 
 46 
appropriate scene while hearing, for example: 
 
1) Place the cursor at the center of the cross. 
2) Put the apple on the towel in the box (experimental trial). 
3) Now put the apple beside the flower (filler sentence). 
4) Now put the flower in the box (filler sentence). 
We also created sixteen additional filler scenes, and participants heard three scene-
appropriate unambiguous filler instructions accompany these. In all cases, six seconds 
separated the offset of one sentence from the onset of the next within each trial. 
Between trials, children saw a large yellow star centered on the screen and heard the 
enthusiastically spoken instruction “Click on the star to go on!”  This step provided a 
natural break in the experiment and helped keep the child motivated.  
In both the one- and two-referent conditions, the target referent always 
appeared in the top left corner of the screen, the incorrect destination always appeared 
in the top right corner, and the correct destination was always located at the bottom 
right corner (as in Figure 1). The bottom left corner of the screen showed either the 
distracter object in the one-referent trials or the second referent in the two-referent 
trials.  Filler sentences prevented participants from detecting the regularity created by 
the object placements in the experimental trials. That is, in addition to the movement 
used in the experimental instructions, eleven distinct movements were possible in the 
visual scene across trials (i.e., bottom right-hand corner to top right-hand corner), and 
an approximately equal number of filler sentences were assigned to each of these. 
Therefore, for each child, ten sentences required an object in the upper left-hand 
corner to be moved to the upper right corner of the display, eight sentences required an 
object in the upper left-hand corner to be moved to the bottom left-hand corner, and so 
on. 
In each scene, participants saw four to six color images, depending on the 
instructions. We used pictures of real objects, taken by a digital camera and edited in 
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Adobe Photoshop, to construct the images in the visual scenes. Visual stimuli 
subtended an average of 5.96 X 4.35 degrees of visual angle, and were 14.38 degrees 
of visual angle diagonally from the central cross. Mouse movements were recorded at 
an average sampling rate of 40 Hz. 
We counterbalanced the experimental items across four presentation lists.  
Each list contained four instances of each possible condition, but only one version of 
each sentence frame and corresponding visual context. Participants were randomly 
assigned to one of the four presentation lists, and the presentation order of the items 
within each list was randomized for each participant. Each participant saw three 
practice items at the beginning of the experiment. 
Each child also completed the Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test—Third 
Edition, PPVT-III (Dunn & Dunn, 1997), a widely-used and reliable test of receptive 
vocabulary.  Participants heard a spoken word and pointed to the correct referent from 
a display of four pictures. Half of the subjects received the PPVT before the computer 
portion of the experiment, and the other half of the subjects received it after. Parents 
completed a form providing information about the child’s computer use and their 
demographic information. The entire session lasted approximately 30 minutes. 
Results 
Data Screening and Coding 
Mouse movements were recorded during the grab-click, transferral, and drop-click of 
the referent object in the experimental trials.  As a result of the large number of 
possible trajectory shapes, the x,y coordinates for each trajectory from each 
experimental trial were plotted in order to detect the presence of errors or otherwise 
aberrant movements. A trajectory was considered valid and submitted to further 
analyses if it was initiated at the top left quadrant of the display (location of the correct 
referent) and terminated in the bottom right quadrant (location of the correct 
 48 
destination), signaling that the correct referent had been picked-up and placed at the 
correct destination. Twelve children were excluded from all trajectory analyses 
because they either produced more than six errors on the sixteen experimental trials or 
committed errors on each of the four trials in one condition.  The error types of all 
forty-three children, along with their frequency per condition, are included in Table 1 
(with the numbers outside of the parentheses indicating the errors of children who 
were included in the trajectory analyses, and the number in the parenthesis indicating 
the error frequencies for all the children). No significant differences existed between 
the included versus the excluded children in age, vocabulary score, gender, or number 
of hours using the computer at home or at school (computer familiarity), all ps > .15. 
Thus, age, vocabulary, and computer familiarity were not likely causes of refusal to 
participate or exclusion from the on-line analysis. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 49 
Table 1:  Error types causing a trial to be excluded from all analyses, per condition.  
The number in parentheses is the number of error trials from children excluded from 
the final on-line analysis; the number outside the parentheses is the number of error 
trials the thirty-one children contributing to the online analyses. 
 
Error Type 1 Referent, 
Ambiguous 
1 Referent, 
Unambiguous 
2 Referent, 
Ambiguous 
2 Referent, 
Unambiguous 
Target Referent 
Moved to 
Incorrect 
Destination 
19 (24) 3 (3) 6 (14) 5 (6) 
Incorrect 
Referent Moved 
to Incorrect 
Destination 
1 (6) 1 (3) 23 (37) 4 (11) 
Incorrect 
Referent Moved 
to Correct 
Destination 
0 (0) 1 (1) 2 (3) 4 (6) 
Picture 
Representing a 
Destination was 
Moved 
1 (1) 0 (1) 1 (2) 1 (3) 
Erratic 
Movement 
Yielding an 
Uninterruptible 
Trajectory  
5 (13) 3 (10) 10 (15) 5 (11) 
 In assessing overall error rates in each condition, children made significantly 
more errors, F(1,42) = 11.96, p<.01, in the two-referent condition (M = 1.26, SD = 
1.19) than in the one-referent condition (M = .72, SD = 1.26).  Similarly, children 
made significantly more errors, F(1,42) = 20.65, p < .01, in the ambiguous-sentence 
condition (M = 1.34, SD = 1.13) than in the unambiguous sentence condition (M = .64, 
SD = .95). However, the interaction was not significant, p >.37. A similar trend 
emerges when looking at only the thirty-one children included in the on-line analyses. 
These children also made significantly more errors, F(1,30) = 9.105, p<.01, in the 
two-referent conditions (M = .98, SD = 1.03) than in the one-referent conditions (M = 
.55, SD = .76).  Similarly, these children made significantly more errors, F(1,30) = 
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17.17, p < .01, in the ambiguous-sentence conditions (M = 1.01, SD = .99) than in the 
unambiguous-sentence conditions (M = .44, SD = .74). However, the interaction was 
not significant, p >.48. These data are similar to the error rates found in previous 
research using eye-tracking (Snedeker & Trueswell, 2004; Trueswell, et al., 1999). 
Ambiguous sentences elicit more off-line errors than the unambiguous sentences due 
to the increased linguistic complexity of the ambiguous sentences.  Similarly, the two-
referent conditions elicit more off-line errors than the one-referent conditions, 
because, in part, two identical possible referents in the visual scene increase the 
complexity of the referential context.   
All analyzable trajectories were time-normalized to 101 time-steps by a 
procedure originally described in Spivey et al. (2005). All trajectories were spatially 
aligned so that the first observation point corresponded to the x,y coordinates of (0, 0). 
Then, across 101 normalized time-steps, the corresponding x and y coordinates were 
computed using linear interpolation.  
The Context and Garden-path Effects 
The mean ambiguous- and unambiguous-sentence trajectories at each of the 101 time-
steps in the top panel of Figure 2 demonstrate that in the one-referent context, like 
adults, the average ambiguous-sentence trajectory was more curved toward the 
incorrect destination than the average trajectory elicited by the unambiguous 
sentences. Unlike adults, however, in the two-referent condition (Figure 2, bottom), 
there still appears to be noticeable attraction toward the incorrect destination for the 
ambiguous-sentence trajectories. Both of these trends support the notion that the 
children were garden-pathed by the syntactic ambiguity manipulation, regardless of 
context.  
 In order to determine whether or not the divergences observed across the 
ambiguous- and unambiguous-sentence trajectories in the one-referent and two-
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referent contexts were statistically reliable, we conducted a series of t-tests. Due to the 
horizontally elongated shape of the overall display, differences in x-coordinates of the 
mouse movements are more indicative of velocity differences, and differences in the 
y-coordinates are more indicative of genuine spatial attraction toward the incorrect 
referent. As such, analyses were conducted separately on the x- and the y-coordinates 
at each of the 101 time-steps. In order to avoid the increased probability of a Type-1 
error associated with multiple t-tests, and in keeping with bootstrap simulations of 
such multiple t-tests on mouse trajectories (Dale, et al., 2007), an observed divergence 
was not considered significant unless the coordinates between the ambiguous- and 
unambiguous-sentence trajectories elicited p-values < .05 for at least eight consecutive 
time-steps. 
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Figure 2. Time-normalized ambiguous- and unambiguous-sentence trajectories elicited 
in the one-referent (top) and two-referent (bottom) contexts. 
In the one-referent context, no significant divergence occurred between the x-
coordinates of the ambiguous- and unambiguous-sentence trajectories indicating that, 
across time, trajectories progressed toward the right side of the screen at 
approximately the same speed in both sentence conditions. For the y-coordinates, 
however, the ambiguous- and unambiguous-sentence trajectories diverged 
significantly from time-steps 43-78, all t’s > 2.08, all p’s < .05, with higher y-
coordinates (closer to zero, thus closer to the top of the screen) in the ambiguous than 
in the unambiguous sentence condition. See Figure 2.  In the one-referent context, the 
divergence of the average y-coordinates of the ambiguous-sentence trajectory away 
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from the unambiguous-sentence trajectory and towards in the incorrect destination is 
indicative of the garden-path effect observed also in eye-tracking research (Snedeker 
& Trueswell, 2004; Trueswell, et al., 1999). 
In the two-referent context, significant x-coordinate divergences between the 
ambiguous- and unambiguous-sentence trajectories occurred from time-steps 9-50, all 
t’s > 2.07, all p’s < .05, with ambiguous-sentence trajectories traveling more quickly 
toward the correct destination. However, in the two-referent context, there was no 
statistically reliable y-coordinate divergence at any of the 101 time-steps. This null 
effect suggests that the two-referent context did not induce the expected garden-path 
effect. This was surprising given the data from previous eye-tracking studies, 
demonstrating that children look often to the incorrect destination, temporarily 
considering it as the goal location of the putting action, even when two referents are 
present. 
Thus, the t-test analyses provide mixed support for the expectation that the data 
obtained by tracking streaming x,y coordinates in mouse-tracking would align with the 
saccadic eye-movements of children in the visual world paradigm (Trueswell et al., 
1999). In the one-referent context, children do consider, at least temporarily, the 
destination interpretation of the ambiguous PP.  In mouse-tracking the curvature 
towards the incorrect destination is commensurate with the large number of looks to 
the incorrect destination in this condition when examining eye-movements. In the two-
referent condition, however, there appears to be no statistically significant attraction 
toward the incorrect destination in the presence of a syntactic ambiguity. This result is 
surprising given previous research and given that in Figure 2 (bottom), there appears 
to be a divergence between ambiguous- and unambiguous-sentence trajectories. 
 One explanation for the incongruence of our results with previous eye-tracking 
results in the two-referent condition is that the amount of variability in the y-
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coordinates of our trajectory data exceeds the power to detect divergence, should it be 
present. In order to reduce the variability surrounding each participant’s mean y-
coordinate movement in each condition, to avoid concerns associated with multiple 
comparisons in the t-tests above, and to assess directly the statistical reliability of the 
crucial Context X Ambiguity interaction, we averaged the y-coordinates recorded 
from time-steps 34-67 (the middle portion of the movement where, on average, the 
ambiguous-unambiguous divergences appear most extreme) and used the average y-
coordinate response as the dependent measure in a 2 (Context) X 2 (Ambiguity) 
repeated-measures ANOVA. Average “middle-segment” y-coordinates were closer to 
the incorrect destination in the one-referent context, suggesting greater uncertainty in 
the one-referent than in the two-referent context, F(1, 30)=7.58, p=.01. The y-
coordinates were also closer to the incorrect destination for the ambiguous over the 
unambiguous condition, F(1, 30)=8.26, p=.007. However, the Context X Ambiguity 
interaction was not significant, F(1, 30)=1.83, n.s., suggesting that context does not 
modulate the magnitude of the garden-path effect.  These data support earlier eye-
tracking data and suggest that children still experience the garden-path effect in the 
two-referent ambiguous context. 
Taken together, these results reveal spatial attraction toward the ultimately 
incorrect destination (i. e. garden-pathing) in response to ambiguous sentences when 
compared to the unambiguous condition, regardless of context. They also suggest that, 
like adults, children experience the garden-path effect in the one-referent, ambiguous-
sentence condition, and that, unlike adults, children do not readily utilize context to 
disambiguate the sentence in the two-referent ambiguous-sentence condition.  
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The Influence of Individual Differences in Linguistic Experience on the Use of 
Referential Context 
As the trajectory data demonstrate, children do not readily incorporate visual context 
into their comprehension of an ambiguous sentence like adults do. Previous research 
(Snedeker & Trueswell, 2004) suggests a role for linguistic experience in accounting 
for the transition to more adult-like behavior in this task. It may be the case that the 
most reliable sources of information in the input children receive are relied on more 
heavily than other information sources of information, such as referential context.  
This explanation implies that children with more linguistic experience may have come 
across either more diverse syntactic constructions or more instances of visual context 
providing a reliable disambiguating cue.  Therefore, children with more linguistic 
experience should behave in a more adult-like way, specifically in the two-referent, 
ambiguous-sentence condition that is typically most difficult for children. Here, we 
aim to establish a more explicit and empirical link between individual differences in 
linguistic experience and more adult-like processing performance. Vocabulary scores 
served as a proxy for linguistic experience, with higher vocabulary scores indicating 
greater linguistic experience (e.g. Hoff, 2003).  
In accessing the vocabulary scores, we explored the degree to which those 
scores could account for difficulty associated with the most difficult condition for this 
age group, the two-referent context (Snedeker & Truesswell, 2004; Trueswell, et al., 
1999). First, we examined the error rates and raw (non-transformed) vocabulary scores 
of all the participants. The raw vocabulary scores significantly predicted the number of 
error trials only in the two-referent ambiguous-sentence condition, t(38)=-2.77, 
p=.009, ß=-.42, R2=.17. See Figure 3.  The relationship is negative, such that children 
with higher vocabularies have fewer error trials in the two-referent ambiguous 
condition than do children with lower vocabularies. This significant relationship 
 56 
implicates vocabulary, and thus linguistic experience, as a strong predictor of who 
could move the correct referent to the correct destination in the critical two-referent, 
ambiguous-sentence condition. 
 
 
Figure 3. Relationship between vocabulary and number of errors in the two-referent, 
ambiguous-sentence condition.  Children with higher vocabulary scores (richer 
linguistic experience) made fewer errors only in this condition. 
We also examined the relationship between the raw vocabulary scores and an 
on-line measure of trajectory divergence.  Of the children who contributed to the on-
line analyses, raw vocabulary scores did not predict the degree of trajectory curvature 
toward the incorrect destination (indexed by calculating the average maximum 
deviation value for ambiguous-sentence trials, per subject) in either the one- or two-
referent ambiguous-sentence conditions.  
Discussion 
These data present an emerging picture whereby the average five-year-old child does 
not employ referential context to override the VP-attachment bias associated with this 
manipulation. This observation, along with the large number of errors made in the 
two-referent ambiguous-sentence condition (Table 1), is consistent with the eye-
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movement data reported in Trueswell et al. (1999) and Snedeker and Trueswell 
(2004). The fact that the trajectory data are commensurate with previously-reported 
eye-tracking data lends support to the notion that the mouse-tracking methodology is a 
feasible and reliable methodology for use in understanding the underlying cognitive 
processes of young children. It is important to note, however, that we do not advocate, 
or foresee, the usurping of eye-tracking methods in lieu of the advantages of mouse-
tracking enumerated here.  Instead, we believe that the two techniques can be used in a 
complementary (even simultaneous) fashion in order to more fully unlock the nature 
of the complex interactions associated with high-level cognitive processes, even in 
young children.  
Further, the results reported here provide insight into the nature of the 
developmental mechanisms responsible for the transition from child-like to more 
adult-like sentence processing skill.  Linguistic experience significantly predicts off-
line errors in the condition that is most difficult for children, the two referent, 
ambiguous-sentence condition.  Children with more linguistic experience produced 
fewer errors in this condition than did children with less linguistic experience, but not 
in any of the other conditions.  To the degree that variability in receptive vocabulary 
serves as a suitable proxy for variability in linguistic experience, these data suggest 
that as children are exposed to richer linguistic experiences, they become more adult-
like in their use of referential context.   
More broadly, our data dovetails with research into the relationship between 
early input and later language processing efficiency (Hurtado, et al., 2008).  In one 
longitudinal study, Hurtado and colleagues (2008) found a link between maternal 
speech and children’s vocabularies. Spanish learning eighteen-month-old children 
whose mothers spoke relatively more to them had larger vocabularies at twenty-four 
months than children whose mothers spoke relatively less to them.  Also, children with 
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larger vocabularies at twenty-four months were faster to identify familiar words in 
speech.  These data further support our assertion that children with richer linguistic 
experience have correspondingly larger vocabularies, and that these early experiences 
influence later language comprehension.  Additionally, Hurtado and colleagues (2008) 
found a link between language input at eighteen months and processing efficiency at 
twenty-four months.  Both quality and quantity of the mother’s speech to the child at 
eighteen months predicted children’s language processing at twenty-four months.  
Children who received relatively more maternal input at the first time point were faster 
in online comprehension tasks at the second time point.  Our research compliments 
this work, extending the link between early input and later processing efficiency to 
five-year-old children.  In our research, larger vocabularies, resulting in part from 
relatively more linguistic experience, predicted off-line error rates in the difficult two-
referent, ambiguous-sentence condition.   
While these data are an important step towards understanding the mechanisms 
underlying the transition from child to adult-like sentence processing abilities, several 
questions remain.  For instance, how does linguistic experience mechanistically 
facilitate this change (Snedeker & Trueswell, 2004)?  There are at least three possible 
explanations: linguistic experience increases reliance on visual scene information, 
linguistic experience decreases reliance on lexical bias information, or linguistic 
experience does both.  First, linguistic experience may increase reliance on visual 
scene information. As children are exposed to a greater variety of sentence 
constructions in an increasing number of communicative contexts, their sensitivity to 
and reliance on cues other than verb-based lexical biases, such as visual context, may 
increase. The statistical relationships that exist between language and properties of a 
co-occurring visual scene are likely to be substantially sparser, and thus more difficult 
to learn, than the statistical information associated with verb-biases in child-directed 
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speech. As a result, efficiently utilizing scene-based referential information during 
language comprehension may simply require more experience with contextualized 
linguistic processing before visual-scene based information can act as a viable cue to 
accurate interpretation. A second possibility is that linguistic experience decreases 
reliance on lexical bias information.  As children are exposed to richer linguistic 
experiences, their reliance on the verb’s lexical bias decreases as a function of 
encountering a greater number of instances where lexical bias is not the only reliable 
cue. Third, linguistic experience may do both.  As linguistic experience increases, 
reliance on other cues, like visual scene information, is increased and reliance on 
lexical bias cues is decreased. Hence, if children have had more linguistic experience, 
they may have more varied experiences with syntactic constructions, specifically with 
the verb “put” being followed by a PP as both VP-attachment and as NP-attachment, 
and they may also have had more experience with the relationship between visual 
context and co-occurring language. Therefore, this third possible explanation suggests 
that a child with greater linguistic experience is more likely to have experienced a) 
more diverse examples of syntactic constructions (decreasing reliance on verb bias) 
and b) more examples of visual context as a reliable disambiguating cue (increasing 
reliance on visual context cues).  
The current results do not suggest which of these three possibilities is most 
accurate, and computational modeling is likely needed to more explicitly examine the 
impact of changing weights according to each of the three alternative explanations. By 
adapting the model used in earlier adult sentence processing research (Farmer, 
Anderson, & Spivey, 2007), the influence of changing individual weights within the 
model can be examined and compared to the behavioral data reported here.  Hence, 
work is underway to examine the impact of changing individual weights in the adult 
sentence processing model in order to more thoroughly explore the mechanistic role of 
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linguistic experience. 
Another unanswered question is what other sources of individual-based 
variability may contribute to this transition?  For example, another factor that may 
contribute to the development of sentence processing skill is the ability to inhibit a 
salient response.  In other words, cognitive control, which develops into late 
adolescence, may contribute to a child becoming more adult-like in their sentence 
comprehension.  As cognitive control increases, the child may be better at inhibiting 
an appealing, or more frequent, but ultimately incorrect response in order to select the 
correct referent and move it to the correct destination without experiencing the garden-
path effect. Individual differences in cognitive control have been shown to reliably 
predict adult performance on ambiguous sentences (Novick, Trueswell, & Thompson-
Schill, 2005).  For example, adults scoring higher on cognitive control tasks exhibit 
less difficulty recovering from misinterpretation of an ambiguity.  
Similarly, recent cross-linguistic research suggests that cognitive control may 
be even more important in accounting for differences between children’s and adult’s 
sentence processing skills than lexical bias information (Choi & Trueswell, 2010).  In 
this research, the experimenters used eye-tracking to compare the performance of 
Korean speaking adults and children.  The data demonstrate that Korean five-year olds 
do not use late-arriving verb bias information to override early-arriving syntactic 
information, producing results similar to those of earlier eye-tracking research looking 
at English-speaking five-year-olds.  These results are striking because English-
speaking children produce similar looking data, but for different reasons; English-
speaking children do not use late arriving syntactic information to override early 
arriving verb bias information.  Even when the lexical bias information is presented 
late, children still persist in garden-pathing in the two-referent, ambiguous-sentence 
condition. Hence, other sources of individual differences, namely cognitive control, 
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may be more important than verb bias in accounting for children’s use of referential 
context and more adult-like performance.   
Cognitive control may also influence how quickly children can move their 
attention around the visual scene.  As discussed earlier, previous research suggests that 
the ability to quickly shift visual attention may play an important role in children’s 
ability to use referential context effectively.  For instance, when a child is prevented 
from viewing the visual scene until she has heard the entire sentence, that child is able 
to perform in a more adult like fashion in the two-referent, ambiguous-sentence 
condition (Crain & Meroni, 2002).  Hence, inhibiting visual attention to a salient 
object, thus increased cognitive control, may be crucial in decreasing the complexity 
of the two-referent ambiguous-sentence condition. 
While there is still much work to be done, the current results provide further 
evidence, converging with previous eye-tracking data, that five-year-olds do not use 
visual cues to disambiguate an ambiguous sentence.  These data also suggest that 
individual differences in linguistic experience may be an important aspect of why this 
is so. Vocabulary scores predict the degree to which children are able to move the 
appropriate item to the appropriate destination in the traditionally difficult two-
referent, ambiguous-sentence condition, implicating linguistic experience as one 
contributor to the transition from child-like to more adult-like processing. 
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CHAPTER 4 
ON THE PATH TO UNDERSTANDING VERBAL ASPECT3 
 
People often talk about past events. While they sometimes highlight the ongoing 
nature of the event, other times they emphasize the beginning or end state.  The goal 
of this paper is to examine the role of grammar in this process.  Specifically, how does 
grammatical aspect influence processing in real time? How might the use of a verb 
such as walked differ from a verb such as was walking?  To what extent do different 
aspectual forms engage perceptual-motor simulations? Here, we explore the influence 
of verbal aspect on the conceptualization of motion events.  The main question is how 
grammatical aspect differentially influences motor output as people are understanding 
language. 
Grammatical aspect provides information about how events unfold in time.  It 
provides information about the completion, duration, or repetition of actions or 
situations expressed by the verb (Comrie, 1976; Frawley, 1992). Take, for example, 
the following sentences: “David ran to the university,” and “David was running to the 
university.” Both convey information about a past event but they use different 
aspectual forms. The first sentence uses the perfective form, specifically simple past, 
of the verb “ran” to emphasize the completion of the action.  The second uses the 
imperfective form, specifically past progressive, to emphasize the ongoing nature of 
that past event.  Here after, we will refer to these as simple past and past progressive 
sentences, respectively.  Even though aspect is known to shape the temporal 
“coloring” of a verb’s information, little is known about the dynamics of cognitive 
processing during comprehension of different aspectual forms. 
                                                 
3 Submitted: Anderson, S.E., Matlock, T., & Spivey, M. (submitted). On the path to understanding 
verbal aspect. 
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Recently, we examined spatial outcome differences in response to simple past 
or past progressive sentences in several offline studies (Matlock, Fausey, Cargill, & 
Spivey, 2007). Participants read a sentence like “This morning David walked to the 
university” (simple past) or “This morning David was walking to the university” (past 
progressive), and saw a schematic drawing that showed a path leading to the 
destination described in the sentence and ten unevenly spaced identical silhouette 
characters on the path (e.g., pedestrian with leg extended forward and arms bent as if 
in motion).  Participants were instructed to “circle the man that the sentence is most 
naturally referring to.” They were more likely to circle a character in the middle region 
of the path with sentences containing past progressive verbs (e.g., was walking), and 
more likely to circle a character in the latter region of the path in response to sentences 
containing a simple past verb (e.g., walked). A similar pattern emerged in a subsequent 
experiment where participants were asked to indicate where along the path an object 
had been dropped after reading simple past or past progressive sentences. These 
results show that when participants read simple past sentences, they focus on the end 
of the path, or the location of the completed action in the scene. In contrast, when 
participants read past progressive sentences, they focus on the middle section of the 
path, where the ongoing action would have taken place. These data indicate that 
different aspectual forms have consequences for thinking about motion events, but 
questions about processing remain. 
Madden and Zwaan (2003) addressed the on-line processing of verbal aspect, 
showing that simple past and past progressive sentences create reaction time 
differences in narrative reading. In one experiment, participants were quicker to 
respond to pictures showing a completed action after they had read a simple past 
sentence (e.g., The car sped through the intersection) versus a past progressive 
sentence (e.g., The car was speeding through the intersection). However, no such 
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latency differences arose when participants read sentences containing past progressive 
verbs and saw pictures of intermediate action. The authors suggest that the effect was 
not significant in the past progressive condition because readers represented the 
ongoing action at different stages of completion.  In other words, past progressive 
sentences could potentially correspond to any of a number of intermediate actions, and 
these diffuse possibilities were not captured by static visual stimuli used in the picture 
verification and reaction time task.  These results suggest that different aspectual 
forms lead to processing differences in real time. (For other work on aspect and spatial 
representation, see Ferretti, Kutas, & McRae, 2007; Magliano & Schleich, 2000; 
Morrow, 1985).  Such reaction time data have revealed valuable insights into the 
processing of aspect.  However, as suggested by the work of Madden and Zwaan 
(2003), they are somewhat limited when investigating diffuse alternatives made 
available by past progressive sentences.  
In addition to such offline and reaction time experiments, there is a great deal 
of information about real-time cognitive processing that can be extracted from the 
motor dynamics of the manual response itself.  For example, factors influencing 
latency to respond also influence later aspects of response dynamics, implying that the 
temporal dynamics of the motor movement that executes a response contain volumes 
of virtually untapped data.  As a simple example, Abrams and Balota (1991) asked 
participants to perform a lexical decision task by rapidly sliding a handle leftward or 
rightward to indicate whether a string of letters was a word or not.  As expected, the 
frequency of the word influenced reaction time, with high frequency words eliciting 
faster onset of response than low frequency words.  Also, they found that word 
frequency influenced response kinematics after the response was initiated. Responses 
to high frequency words were executed with greater force than responses to low 
frequency words. These findings suggest that word frequency not only influences the 
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time required to recognize a word, but also influences response dynamics, suggesting 
that the response system is not slavishly executing a stereotyped command in response 
to the categorical status of the word. This makes a compelling case for looking not 
only at reaction time differences, but also at variables of the motor movements 
themselves initiated in response to a stimulus. 
A similar case of ongoing motor movements revealing cognitive processing 
was produced by Richardson and Matlock (2007), when they analyzed eye movements 
during comprehension of fictive motion sentences.  In fictive motion sentences, 
motion verbs are used to depict the extent of an object or action without there actually 
being any motion in the situation being described, as in “The fence ran from the house 
to the garage.”  Previous work by Matlock (2004) had shown that response times for 
reading fictive motion sentences were longer than responses to equivalent sentences 
that did not use fictive motion.  However, Richardson and Matlock were able to 
uncover the real-time temporal dynamics of processing by showing that listeners made 
more eye movements scanning along the specific region of the screen where the 
mentally simulated motion takes place.  Their results suggested that a fictive-motion 
use of verbs generates a perceptual simulation that has some form of implied motion 
in it. 
For the present study, aimed at improving our understanding of the perceptual 
simulations associated with different aspectual forms of verbs, we have employed a 
methodology that was inspired by the eye-tracking paradigm: computer-mouse 
tracking. Monitoring the streaming x- and y-coordinates of goal-directed mouse 
movements in response to spoken language is a useful indicator of underlying 
cognitive processes. In contrast to ballistic saccades, arm movements allow for a 
continuous, smooth motor output within a single trial to complement eye-tracking 
research.  Spivey, Grosjean, and Knoblich (2005) demonstrated that these mouse 
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movements can be used to index the continuous activation of lexical alternatives. By 
recording the x,y coordinates of the mouse as it moved with the goal-directed hand 
motion to click on the appropriate object, competition between the partially active 
lexical alternatives was revealed in the shape and curvature of the hand-movement 
trajectories. Computer-mouse tracking has also been informative for sentence 
processing studies (Farmer, Anderson, & Spivey, 2007), children’s sentences 
processing (Anderson, Farmer, Schwade, Goldstein, & Spivey, to appear), semantic 
categorization (Dale, Kehoe, & Spivey, 2007), color categorization (Huette & 
McMurray, 2010), decision making (McKinstry, Dale, & Spivey, 2008), and social 
judgments (Freeman, Ambady, Rule, & Johnson, 2008; Wojnowicz, Ferguson, Dale, 
& Spivey, 2009). 
Further, our own earlier data indicates that mouse-tracking is useful and 
informative for exploring research questions about the on-line processing of 
grammatical aspect (Anderson, Matlock, Fausey, & Spivey, 2008).  In one experiment, 
participants listened to sentences like, “Tom jogged to the woods and then stretched 
when he got there,” or “Tom was jogging to the woods and then stretched when he got 
there.” While participants heard these sentences, they saw scenes consisting of a path 
curving upwards from left to right, and terminating at the destination described in the 
sentence. A character was located to the right of the beginning of the path and under 
the destination, separated from the scene by a black box framing the destination and 
path.  See Figure 4.  The two aspectual forms elicited significantly different movement 
durations: participants spent a longer period of time moving the character into the 
scene with past progressive sentences than when they heard sentences containing 
simple past verbs.  These data converge with and further inform earlier research, 
supporting the idea that past progressive aspect focuses attention on the on-going 
nature of the action while simple past aspect focuses attention on the end state of that 
 67 
action, even during real time processing.  
 
Figure 4. Visual scene accompanying sound files in Anderson, Fausey, Matlock, & 
Spivey (2008). 
 In the current experiments, we employed mouse-tracking to further investigate 
the online processing of different verbal aspectual forms.  In Experiment 1, we 
replicated the earlier results of Anderson et al. (2008), extending them to a different 
visual scene in which we can test for effects in the specific region of the screen where 
the mentally simulated motion takes place. Experiments 2 and 3 extend these results 
by examining future tenses (Experiment 2) and the role of contextual descriptions 
(Experiment 3).  
Experiment 1 
In the current experiment, we used the mouse-tracking methodology to explore 
differences in comprehending the two past tense forms (simple past and past 
progressive) that have been empirically studied before.  Prior research suggests that 
simple past sentences (e.g., walked) focus on a completed action (Madden & Zwaan, 
 68 
2003) and to the location of that completed action (Anderson, et al., 2008; Matlock, et 
al., 2007).  On the other hand, past progressive sentences (e.g., was walking) focus on 
the ongoing nature of the verb and the location of that ongoing action (Anderson, et al, 
2008, Matlock, et al., 2007).  Here, we extended these findings to investigate the 
interaction of verbal aspect and visual scene information, by adapting the visual scene 
used in earlier work to display a shorter, non-curving path.  This change allowed us to 
explore not only overall movement durations but also movement durations within the 
area of the visual scene corresponding to the path, the specific region of the ongoing 
action described by the sentence.   
Method 
Participants 
Sixty-four undergraduates at Cornell University participated in the experiment for 
extra credit in psychology courses.  All were right handed and native speakers of 
American English. 
Materials 
Twelve sentences were created by adapting the stimuli used in the offline studies of 
Matlock et al. (2007).  As we hoped to elicit movements across the entire scene, from 
which we could extract differences in motor dynamics between the two conditions, a 
final clause that described an event at the destination was added, encouraging 
movement all the way to the destination.  Two versions of each of the 12 experimental 
items were created, as shown below: (1a) simple past sentence, (1b) past progressive 
sentence. 
1a) David walked to the university where he sat in class. 
1b) David was walking to the university where he sat in class. 
Sentences were recorded using Mac-based sound software. Each of the experimental 
items was spliced to produce both a past progressive and a simple past version, 
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ensuring that the prosody for both of the targets was otherwise identical.  The 
experimental items were counterbalanced across two presentation lists.  Each list 
contained six instances of each condition, so that all participants heard all 12 target 
sentences, but only one version of each target frame.  
Corresponding visual scenes were created for each target sentence pair. Each 
target visual scene consisted of a diagonal path starting halfway up and on the extreme 
left side of the screen.  The path slanted to the right, terminating in the middle top of 
the screen. A character was located to the right of the beginning of the path and under 
the destination, separated from the scene by a black box framing the destination and 
path.  See Figure 5. The depicted items in the scene were created by hand or taken 
from clipart and edited in Adobe Photoshop. The only moveable item in the scene was 
the character, which subtended an average of 1.53 degrees of visual angle in width by 
2.05 degrees in height. The destinations were an average of 11.22 degrees in width by 
4.09 degrees in height, and the path itself occupied a square of 8.42 degrees in width 
by 6.11 degrees in height. The character was located 14.25 degrees from the 
destination. The stimuli were presented using Macromedia Director MX, and mouse 
movements were recorded at an average sampling rate of 40 Hz. The display 
resolution was set to 1024 x 768. 
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Figure 5. Example target visual scene accompanied by target sentences in Experiments 
1, 2 and 3.    
To keep participants from developing strategies specific to the experimental sentences, 
12 filler items were created.  Like the target items, the fillers contained either a past 
progressive or simple past verb.  Unlike, the target items, the filler trials described no 
movement along the path (e.g.,  “Janet swam in the pool and then dried in the sun,”).  
These filler items were accompanied by 12 filler scenes, created using a short path 
beginning on the right side of the screen and slanting to the top, center of the screen.  
Other than path direction, each filler scene was similar to the target scenes.   
Procedure 
Participants were asked to make themselves comfortable in front of the computer and 
allowed to adjust the mouse and mouse-pad to a location that suited them. First, 
participants read instructions to place the character into the scene to make the scene 
match the sentence they heard.  After indicating that they understood the task, 
participants were next presented with two practice trials (similar to the filler trials), 
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followed by the experimental task.  At the onset of each trail, participants were 
presented with the entire visual scene.  After a 500 ms preview, the sound file began.  
After the participant had moved the character (though not to any particular location), a 
“Done” button appeared in the bottom left corner of the screen.  Participants clicked 
this button to move to the next trial. A blank screen with a button in the center labeled 
“Click here to go on” separated the trials. The entire experiment lasted approximately 
20 minutes.   
Results 
Mouse movements were recorded during the grab-click, transferal, and drop-click of 
the character in the experimental trials. Prior to the analyses, the data were screened to 
remove extremely long trials (trials longer than 20 seconds).  Using this criterion, no 
trials were removed. However, one subject was removed from the analyses due to 
computer malfunction.   
Drop Locations 
Previous offline results, with sentences that did not contain an extra clause 
encouraging participants to move the character all the way to the destination, revealed 
that participants chose a location closer to the middle of the path as the best 
representative of a sentence containing a past progressive verb, while selecting a 
location closer to the destination as the best representative of a sentence containing a 
simple past verb (Matlock, et al., 2007).  Here, we plotted the drop point (location 
along the path where each participant let go of the mouse to “drop” the character) in 
both conditions. However, the current results do not demonstrate the trend found in 
earlier offline experiments. There was no effect of aspect when comparing the average 
drop location x-coordinates (p > .6) or y-coordinates (p > .5).  Thus, due to the extra 
clause (e.g., “…where he sat in class.”), participants were moving the character across 
the screen to the destination about equally in the simple past and past progressive 
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conditions.  This actually works well for our purposes because it means that, rather 
than dropping the character onto the path itself, participants carried the character 
across the region of the path, thereby providing motor dynamics for us to measure in 
the specific region of the screen where mentally simulated motion may be taking 
place. 
Spatial Differences 
In order to start investigating online aspectual differences, we first looked (as previous 
mouse-tracking studies have done) at spatial differences between the average 
trajectories elicited in response to simple past sentences and past progressive 
sentences. To determine whether the two average trajectories significantly diverged 
from each other, we time-normalized the trajectories and conducted a series of t-tests 
at each of the 101 time-steps. These analyses were conducted separately on the x- and 
the y-coordinates at each of the 101 time-steps to compare spatial differences across 
participants and across conditions. To avoid the increased probability of a Type-1 
error associated with multiple t-tests, and in keeping with Bootstrap simulations of 
such multiple t-tests on mouse trajectories (Dale, Kehoe, & Spivey, 2007), an 
observed divergence was not considered significant unless the coordinates between the 
simple past and past progressive sentence trajectories elicited p-values < .05 for at 
least eight consecutive time-steps. 
There were no significant differences in either the x or the y coordinates for the 
101-timesteps.  That is, the movement trajectories in the past progressive condition did 
not curve or shift in any direction relative to those in the simple past condition. The 
spatial extent of the two averaged movement trajectories were essentially overlapping 
one another, suggesting that participants were not intentionally acting out an explicit 
adherence to the depicted path in one condition and avoiding the depicted path in the 
other condition.  
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Movement Durations 
After observing no differences due to aspectual form in the spatial properties of the 
trajectories, we turned our analysis to the temporal properties of the trajectories. There 
was a significant difference between the two aspectual forms when comparing overall 
movement durations (i.e., the length of time from the initial grab of the character to 
the final drop of the character into the scene), t(62) = 2.22, p > .05.  See Figure 6 (left 
panel).  This difference was the result of significantly longer movement durations in 
response to sentences containing past progressive verbs (M = 4749 ms, SD = 2548) 
than to sentences containing simple past verbs (M = 4214 ms, SD = 1971).   
 
Figure 6. Movement duration differences for the overall trajectory, left panel, and in 
the region of the visual scene corresponding to the path, right panel, for Experiment 1. 
 In addition, the shorter path used in the visual scene (Figure 5) enabled us to 
investigate movement duration differences in the specific region of the screen where 
we hypothesize the participant is generating a perceptual simulation of motion (as in 
Richardson & Matlock, 2007). Looking at the movement durations in the region of the 
computer screen corresponding to the visually presented path, we found significantly 
different movement durations, t(62) = 2.07, p<.05).  See Figure 6 (right panel). This 
difference is due to significantly longer movement durations in the region of the path 
in response to sentences containing past progressive verbs (M = 3356 ms, SD = 2603) 
than to sentences containing simple past verbs (M = 2805 ms, SD = 1692).  
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Discussion 
Mouse-tracking enables the investigation of many indexes of response/motor 
dynamics.  We looked at several of these indexes, including drop locations, time 
normalized spatial differences, and movement durations.  Drop locations and time-
normalized spatial differences did not demonstrate significant differences between 
processing simple past and past progressive sentences.  However, movement duration 
differences showed that participants move the character across the scene for a longer 
period of time, both in the overall trajectory and in the trajectory corresponding to the 
specific region of the visually presented path, in response to past progressive sentences 
than to simple past sentences. These results complement and extend the results of 
earlier experiments investigating the processing of verbal aspect (Madden & Zwaan, 
2003; Anderson, et al., 2008).  Because simple past sentences focus attention on 
completed action, this makes the location of that completed action, namely the 
destination in the visual display, most salient. On the other hand, past progressive 
sentences encourage attention to the ongoing-ness of the action, making the region of 
that ongoing action (the path in the scene) most salient.   
Experiment 2 
The results of Experiment 1 allowed us to compare aspectual forms in the past tense 
descriptions alone, but they say nothing about processing aspect in present or future 
tense descriptions.  For instance, does future tense afford similar motor dynamics to 
those of past tense? Or do future tenses not afford the same motor differences, since 
future tense refers to an event that has not yet occurred? While such questions have 
not yet been addressed empirically, the results of Experiment 1 suggest that mouse-
tracking is a viable way to look at potential processing differences created by different 
verb tenses.  Here, we adapted the materials and method of Experiment 1 to 
investigate how aspect in future tense descriptions influences motor output, and how 
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future tense might differ from past tense descriptions. To tease apart aspect and tense, 
we designed the experiment to have separate independent variables: tense (future or 
past) and aspect (perfective or imperfective). 
Method 
Participants 
Sixty-four undergraduates participated in this experiment: 33 undergraduates from 
University of California, Merced and 31 undergraduates from Cornell University. 
University of California, Merced undergraduates participated for extra credit in 
Cognitive Science courses, and Cornell undergraduates participated for extra credit in 
Psychology courses.  All were right handed and native speakers of American English. 
Materials and Procedures 
Sixteen sentences were created by adapting the stimuli of Experiment 1. The final 
clause, added to encourage movement all the way to the destination, was altered here 
to make the target sentence frames sound natural in both the past and future tenses.  
Four versions of each of the 16 experimental items were created, as shown in Table 2: 
2a) past tense, perfective aspect (simple past), 2b) past tense, imperfective aspect (past 
progressive), 2c) future tense, perfective aspect (future simple), and 2d) future tense, 
imperfective aspect  
(future continuous).   
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Table 2: Target stimuli accompanying visual scene for Experiment 2. 
  
Perfective aspect 
 
 
Imperfective aspect 
 
Past tense 2a) David walked to the 
university for class. 
 
2b) David was walking to 
the university for class. 
Future tense 2c) David will walk to 
the university for class. 
 
2d) David will be 
walking to the university 
for class. 
 
Sentences were recorded using a Mac-based sound software. Each of the 16 
experimental items was spliced to produce each of the four experimental conditions, 
ensuring that the prosody of the targets was otherwise identical.  An additional 20 
seconds of silence was added to the end of each target sentence, allowing us to time 
lock participants’ mouse-movements to the raw time stamp of the sound files.  The 
experimental items were counterbalanced across four presentation lists.  Each list 
contained four instances of each condition, so a participant heard all the target 
sentence frames, but only one version of each. 
Corresponding visual scenes were created for each target sentence frame.  
These visual scenes were identical in their specifications as the visual stimuli of 
Experiment 1.  See Figure 4.  
Similarly, 16 filler items were created to prevent participants from developing 
strategies specific to the experimental items.  As in Experiment 1, they were of the 
same form as the target sentences, containing each of the four verbal aspects, but 
differed in that they described no motion along the path (i.e., “Janet will swim in the 
pool for exercise”).  The filler items were accompanied by16 filler scenes, created 
using a short path beginning on the right side of the screen and slanting to the top, 
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center of the screen.  Besides the direction of the path, each filler scene was quite 
similar to the target scenes. The procedure was identical to that of Experiment 1.  
Results 
Mouse movements were recorded during the grab-click, transferal, and drop-click of 
the character in the experimental trials. Prior to the analyses, the data were screened to 
remove extremely long trials (trials longer than 20 seconds).  Using this criterion, no 
trials were removed.  However, one subject was removed from the analyses due to 
failure to comply with the instructions; rather than moving the character into the 
scene, this participant clicked the “done” button when it appeared on the screen for 
over half of the target trials.   
Drop Locations 
We began our investigation by looking at the outcome differences between the tenses 
(future and past) and aspect (perfective or imperfective).  We plotted the drop location 
in each of the four conditions. See Figure 7.  We analyzed the x- and y-coordinates for 
the drop locations separately.  
 
Figure 7. Drop locations in response to past perfective (a), past imperfective (b), future 
perfective sentences (c), and future imperfective sentences  (d), for Experiment 2. 
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For the x-coordinates, the interaction between tense (future and past) and 
aspect (perfective and imperfective) was not significant, and there was no main effect 
of aspect, p’s >.3.  However, there was a main effect of tense, F (1,62) = 15.95, p 
<.05. The x-coordinates of the drop location in response to past tense sentences (both 
perfective and imperfective), M = 532 x-pixel, SD = 81, were further to the right 
(closer to the destination) than the drop locations in response to future sentences, M = 
485 x-pixel, SD = 112. 
A similar picture emerges for the y-coordinates.  There was no interaction 
between verb tense and aspect, and there was no significant effect of aspect, p’s > .1.  
However, there is a main effect of tense, F(1,62) = 18.747, p < .05.  The y-coordinates 
of the drop location in response to past tense sentences, M = 202 y-pixel, SD = 226, 
was significantly closer to the destination (higher on the screen) than those produced 
in response to future tense sentences, M = 226 y-pixel, SD = 55.  These results are 
commenserate with the drop location analyses of Experiment 1: drop location 
differences were not significant when comparing past progressive (imperfective) and 
simple past (perfective) verbs.  However, future tense sentences elicit drop locations 
further away from the landmark, indicating greater uncertainty about this event that 
has not yet occurred. 
Time-Normalized Spatial Differences 
Figure 8 shows the average time-normalized trajectories in each of the four conditions. 
Visual inspection shows that the past tense conditions are closer to the destination than 
the average trajectories of the future tense conditions.  Similar to the drop location 
differences, this suggests that the future tense may increase the uncertainty about an 
event that has not yet happened, resulting in average trajectories further from the 
destination. Similarly, the two average trajectories produced in response to 
imperfective sentences (past progressive and future continuous) are further from the 
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destination than the perfective sentences (simple past and future).  This supports the 
hypotheses that imperfective sentences direct attention to the location of the ongoing 
action.   
 
 
Figure 8. Average time-normalized trajectories, for Experiment 2. 
To statistically assess spatial differences, we time-normalized the trajectories. 
A series of t-tests was conducted on each of 101 time-steps to compare spatial 
differences across participants and across conditions, as in Experiment 1. In keeping 
with Bootstrap simulations of such multiple t-tests on mouse trajectories (Dale et al., 
2007), an observed divergence was not considered significant unless the divergence 
elicited p-values < .05 for at least eight consecutive time-steps. The x- and the y-
coordinates were tested separately.  
 For the x-coordinates, the interaction and the main effect of aspect were not 
significant.  However, there was a main effect of tense, with a significant divergence 
of the future tense average time-normalized trajectories away from those of the past 
tense trajectories and closer to the path between timesteps 49 to 101.  The pattern of 
results is similar when examining the y-coordinates.  For the y-coordinates, the 
interaction of tense and aspect was not significant.  However, the main effect of tense 
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was significant. The future tense trajectories significantly diverged away from those of 
the past tense trajectories and away from the destination from timesteps 46 to 101.  
Also, in the y-coordinates there was a main effect of verb from timesteps 4 to 17, and 
again from timesteps 63 to 78.  These y-coordinate differences were a result of the 
imperfective sentence trajectories diverging from the perfective sentence trajectories 
and tending towards the lower portion of the screen, or away from the destination.  
 To examine these spatial differences and preserve a time course reference at 
the same time, we returned to the raw (non-normalized) timestamps, corresponding to 
specific elements of the sound files, in the online trajectories. We used these raw 
timestamps to examine the average x and y coordinates at each of eight time bins.  The 
first time bin corresponded to the time between the offset of the verb and 250 ms after 
this onset.  Each of the following seven time bins corresponded to consecutive 
incremental 250 ms timebins. Correcting for multiple comparisons, we found no 
significant effects in either the x- or the y-coordinates, p’s>.05.   
Movement Durations 
As in Experiment 1, we concluded our investigation of online processing by looking at 
the temporal dynamics of the movement of the character into the visual scene. In 
looking at the movement duration for the overall trajectory, there was no significant 
interaction of tense and aspect, p >.7.  Similarly, there was no main effect of tense, 
p>.5. However, the main effect of aspect (perfective vs. imperfective) was significant 
for the overall trajectory, F (1,62) = 8.129, p <.05. See Figure 9 (left panel). Sentences 
containing perfective verbs, i.e., ran or will run, elicited shorter movement durations 
(M = 2598 ms, SD = 1263) than sentences containing imperfective verbs, i.e., was 
running or will be running (M = 3025 ms, SD = 1832).  
 81 
 
Figure 9. Movement duration differences for the overall trajectory, left panel, and in 
the region of the visual scene corresponding to the path, right panel, for Experiment 2. 
  The pattern of results was similar when looking at movement durations in the 
specific region of the screen corresponding to the visually presented path. The 
interaction of tense and aspect was not significant, p > .9.  Also, the main effect of 
tense was not significant, p > .9.  However, there is a significant main effect of aspect 
for the movement duration differences corresponding to the visually presented path, F 
(1,62) =7.849, p < .05).  See Figure 9 (right panel).  Movement durations were longer 
in response to sentences containing imperfective verbs, M = 2050 ms, SD = 1513, than 
to sentences containing perfective verbs, M = 1620 ms, SD = 1001. 
Discussion 
The results of Experiment 2 dovetail with the results of Experiment 1 and contribute 
further to our understanding of how aspect is processed.  In Experiment 2, we 
examined not only the processing differences associated with comprehending past 
tense sentences but also those entailed by comprehending future tense sentences.  Fist, 
drop location differences emerged as a function only of tense (past or future), with the 
drop locations of future tense sentences being further from the destination than those 
of the past tense sentences.  This is compatible with the results of Experiment 1, where 
we found that aspect caused no differences in drop location. Future tense sentences 
elicit drop locations further from the landmark, suggesting increased uncertainty as to 
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the completed-ness of an action that has not yet occurred.  
This increased attention to the location of a future action is also reflected in the 
analysis of spatial differences between different verbal aspects.  In the x-coordinates, 
the main effect of tense for a large number of timesteps indicates that processing 
future tense sentences entails a greater amount of attention to the ongoing 
uncompleted action of the future-tense event, with participants adhering more closely 
to the path.  In the y-coordinates, a main effect of aspect implies that sentences 
containing imperfective verbs (was walking or will be walking) direct attention to the 
location of the ongoing action, namely the path.  Tense also influences these spatial 
differences; sentences containing future tense verbs are moved into the scene more 
closely to the path, as this will be the location of the future action.  Hence, the 
influences of aspect and tense additively result in the different movement trajectories 
produced in response to each of these conditions. 
Our movement duration differences also support the results of Experiment 1.  
A main effect of aspect in both the overall trajectory and in the region of the screen 
corresponding to the path implies that aspect drives these differential motor outputs.  
After reading a perfective sentence, movement durations are shorter than after reading 
an imperfective sentence, regardless of tense.  
Experiment 3 
In Experiment 3, we sought to expand on the results of Experiment 1 by investigating 
the way verbal aspect interacts with terrain descriptions.  Previous research has shown 
that context descriptions interact with fictive, or implicit, motion verbs to produce 
differences in reaction times (Matlock, 2004) and eye-movement patterns (Richardson 
& Matlock, 2007). In one experiment, when participants first heard context sentences 
describing a terrain as difficult, inspection times and eye-movement scanning along 
the path were increased as opposed to when participants heard the terrain described as 
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easy (Richardson & Matlock, 2007). These results support earlier reaction time results, 
where participants read narratives describing a terrain, and then made decisions about 
whether a fictive motion sentence was related to the preceding context (Matlock, 
2004).  Participants were slower to respond to fictive motion sentences when they had 
read a context sentence describing difficult terrain than when they had read a context 
describing easy terrain. While these results demonstrate that context interacts with 
implicit motion verbs, the impact of such contextual descriptions have not been 
explored in relation to verbal aspect. Hence, Experiment 3 investigates how contextual 
information interacts with aspectual forms of explicit motion verbs. 
Method 
Participants 
Sixty-four undergraduates at Cornell University participated in the experiment for 
extra credit in psychology courses.  All were right handed and native speakers of 
American English. 
Materials and Procedures 
Twelve sentences were created by adapting the stimuli of Experiment 1. In addition, 
two linguistic contexts for each stimulus were created.  Hence, four versions of each 
of the 12 experimental items were created, as shown in Table 3 below: (3a) rough path 
description, simple past sentence, (3b) rough path description, past progressive 
sentence, (3c) smooth path description, simple past sentence (3d), smooth path 
description, past progressive sentence. 
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Table 3: Target stimuli accompanying visual scene for Experiment 3.  
 Simple past sentence 
 
Past progressive sentence 
Rough context 
description 
 
3a) The road to the 
university was rocky and 
bumpy. / David walked to 
the university where he sat 
in class. 
 
 
3b) The road to the university 
was rocky and bumpy. / David 
was walking to the university 
where he sat in class. 
 
 
Smooth context 
description 
 
3c) The road to the 
university was level and 
clear. / David walked to 
the university where he sat 
in class. 
 
 
3d) The road to the university 
was level and clear. / David was 
walking to the university where 
he sat in class. 
 
Sentences were recorded using Mac-based sound software. Each of the 12 
experimental items was spliced to produce both a past progressive and a simple past 
version, ensuring that the prosody of the targets was otherwise identical. Similarly, the 
context description was spliced onto the beginning of each of these target sentences.  
A pause of one second separated the offset of each context sentence from the onset of 
the target sentence.  The experimental items were counterbalanced across four 
presentation lists.  Each list contained three instances of each condition, so that all 
participants heard all 12 target sentences, but only heard one version of each.  
 Corresponding visual scenes were created for each target sentence frame.  
These visual scenes were identical in their specifications as the visual stimuli of 
Experiment 1.  See Figure 4.  
Additionally, 12 filler items were created to prevent participants from 
developing strategies specific to the experimental items. The fillers were of the same 
form as the target sentences: each contained a context description and either a past 
progressive or simple past verb.  These filler trials varied from the target trials such 
that the first sentence provided no information about the path (i.e., “The weather in the 
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valley was warm and humid”) and that the second sentence described no movement 
along the path (i.e., “Janet swam in the pool and then dried in the sun,”).  These filler 
items were accompanied by 12 filler scenes, created using a short path beginning on 
the right side of the screen and slanting to the top, center of the screen.  Besides the 
direction of the path, each filler scene was quite similar to the target scenes. The 
procedure was identical to that of Experiment 1.  
Results 
Mouse movements were recorded during the grab-click, transferal, and drop-click of 
the character in the experimental trials. Prior to the analyses, the data were screened to 
remove extremely long trials.  Movement durations of 20 seconds or more were 
removed because they constituted an unusually long time for a mouse-movement.  
Using this criteria, only three trials (less than 0.4%) of trajectories, were excluded. 
Drop Locations  
In plotting the drop location in each of the four conditions, the current results 
demonstrate a similar trend to those observed in earlier offline experiments.  See 
Figure 10. There was not a significant interaction of terrain description and verb 
aspect (p’s > .5). However, there was a main effect of verb aspect when comparing the 
average drop x-coordinate, F (1,62) = 8.462, p < 0.05, with the average drop x-
coordinate being further left (closer to the path) when participants heard past 
progressive sentences (M = 477 x-pizel, SD = 69) than when they heard simple past 
sentences (M = 495 x-pixel, SD = 62).  Similarly, there was a main effect of aspect 
when comparing the average drop y-coordinate, F (1,62) = 6.048, p < 0.05, with the 
average drop y-coordinate being lower (further from the destination) when participants 
heard past progressive sentences (M = 219, SD = 37) than when they heard simple past 
sentences (M = 211, SD = 41).  
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Figure 10. Drop locations in response to simple past sentences, left panel, and past 
progressive sentences, right panel, for Experiment 3. 
Spatial Attraction 
Figure 11 shows the average time-normalized trajectories in each of the four 
conditions.  The mean simple past and past progressive trajectories at each of the 101 
time-steps in the left panel of Figure 11 illustrate that in the rough terrain context, the 
average past progressive trajectory curved more toward the path than the average 
trajectory elicited by the simple past sentences, but only near the end of the trajectory.  
However, in the smooth terrain description, (Figure 11, right panel), there appears to 
be greater attraction toward the path across a greater portion of the trajectory for the 
past progressive sentences.  
 
Figure 11. Average time-normalized simple past and past progressive sentence 
trajectories in rough and smooth terrain contexts, for Experiment 3. 
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To statistically assess spatial differences, the trajectories were time normalized, 
and a series of t-tests was conducted on each of 101 time-steps to compare spatial 
differences across participants and across conditions, as in Experiments 1 and 2. 
Again, an observed divergence was not considered significant unless the divergence 
elicited p-values < .05 for at least eight consecutive time-steps. The x- and the y-
coordinates were tested separately.   
In both the x-and y-coordinates, the interaction of context and aspect was not 
significant, all p’s >.05.  In the rough context description condition, there was 
significant divergence of the past progressive x-coordinates away from the simple past 
x-coordinates and toward the path between time-steps 89 and 101, p’s <.05, and no 
significant divergence in the y-coordinates. This difference is similar to the observed 
differences in drop locations for past progressive and simple past sentences. Hence, 
this significant divergence so late in the time-normalized trajectories may simply be an 
artifact of drop locations.   
In the smooth context description, there were significant divergences of the 
past progressive x-coordinates away from the simple past x-coordinates towards the 
path between time steps 48 and 60, p’s <.05, and again between time steps 65 and 89, 
p’s < .05.  There was also significant divergence of the average past progressive y-
coordinates away from the average simple past y-coordinates and towards the path 
between time steps 89 and 101.  Again, this divergence late in the trajectory may be an 
artifact of the drop locations in each condition.    
 To examine the time-sensitive differences in spatial attraction to the visual 
scene’s path across conditions, we looked separately at the average x- and y-
coordinates within eight 250ms time-bins of the movement duration.  As in 
Experiment 2, there was no significant interaction between aspect and terrain, p’s>.1, 
or main effect of either variable, p’s>2.  
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Movement Durations 
Finally, we concluded our investigation of the online processing of context and verbal 
aspect by looking at the temporal dynamics of the movement of the character into the 
visual scene. There was no significant interaction of context and aspect when 
comparing overall movement durations, p’s> .2. However, there was a significant 
interaction of context and aspect on movement durations within in the specific region 
of the screen corresponding to the depicted path, F(1, 63) = 4.6, p < .05.  See Figure 
12.  
 
Figure 12. Movement duration differences in the region of the visual scene 
corresponding to the path, for Experiment 3. 
In the region of the path, the average movement duration for simple past 
sentences was not significantly different when the context was first described as rough 
(M= 2448 ms, SD=1849) or smooth (M=2479 ms, SD= 1527).  By contrast, with past 
progressive sentences, the average movement duration in the region of the path was 
slower when the context was first described as rough (M = 2668 ms, SD=1680) than 
when it was described as smooth (M=2122 ms, SD=1240). As seen in Richardson and 
Matlock (2007), when language directs attention to a mental simulation of motion in a 
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region of the screen (either by fictive motion verbs in their case, or by past progressive 
aspect in the present case), one sees robust effects of context stories describing how 
that region would affect that motion.  Because simple past sentences focus attention on 
completed action, context descriptions of the traversal region do not significantly 
impact the movement dynamics.  On the other hand, because past progressive 
sentences encourage attention to the ongoing-ness of the action in the specific region 
of that movement, context descriptions of that path do influence processing.  
Discussion 
In addition to corroborating previous work on grammatical aspect, these data also 
reveal new insights about processing through the examination of continuous motor 
output in response to aspectual and contextual differences.  First, drop locations 
reliably differed between aspectual forms, with the past progressive condition eliciting 
drop locations closer to the path, and the simple past condition eliciting drop locations 
closer to the destination. This tendency to drop a character closer to the path in the 
past progressive condition and closer to the destination in the simple past condition, 
replicates previous evidence that the ongoing nature implied by a past progressive 
sentence draws attention to the middle portion of the path, whereas there is a tendency 
to focus attention on the destination in response to simple past sentences. However, we 
did not find this trend in Experiments 1 and 2.  This may be because the contextual 
description of the path in Experiment 3 made the visually presented path more salient.  
By doing so, these context descriptions may constrain the locations for these drop 
points, thus decreasing variability and allowing us to detect statistically significant 
differences.    
Similarly, contextual descriptions interacted significantly with verbal aspect in 
movement durations, but only in the region of the screen depicting the path.  
Contextual descriptions did not significantly modulate simple past movement 
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durations, because of the simple past’s emphasis on the completed action. However 
past progressive movement durations were significantly faster when preceded by an 
easy terrain description than when preceded by a rough terrain description. That we do 
not find differences in the overall movement duration trajectories may again be due to 
the contextual description of the path making that region of the screen more salient.   
Finally, while the coarse measure of raw-time spatial attraction to the path did 
not reveal statistically significant results, there was a significant spatial divergence of 
the past progressive trajectory away from the simple past trajectory and toward the 
destination in both contextual descriptions.  Divergences late in the trajectory may be 
a result of differences in drop location, but divergences across the trajectories after the 
smooth context description provide further evidence for processing differences 
between these two aspectual forms. While these results are encouraging, they are not 
as convincing as the path-movement duration results (Figure 12).  It is curious that the 
spatial attraction differences were detected in the smooth context description but not 
as robustly in the rough context description.  Perhaps the visual stimuli used to depict 
the path simply did not appear to afford difficult or uneven travel, and the 
incongruence in the linguistic description and the visual appearance of the path 
hindered the emergence of full spatial differences in this context description.  Future 
work will investigate this possibility. 
General Discussion 
The results of the three experiments reported here are in line with previous research 
using mouse-tracking (Anderson, et al., 2008), narrative reading (Madden & Zwaan, 
2003), surveys (Fausey & Matlock, in press; Matlock, in press), and offline judgment 
tasks (Matlock, et al., 2007). Experiment 1 provides new evidence that different 
grammatical forms influence the processing of event descriptions, with the simple past 
(e.g., walked) focusing attention on the end of the path and the location of the 
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completed action, and past progressive (e.g., was walking) focusing attention to the 
“middle” of the event and the spatial region of that ongoing action. Experiment 2 
provides evidence that other tenses additively influence the processing of event 
descriptions.  These data show that the open-ended nature of future tenses, indicating 
action events that have not yet occurred, and imperfective aspect additively increase 
attention to the location of the verb’s action: the path.  Experiment 3, in addition to 
corroborating previous work on grammatical aspect, reveals new insights about their 
processing by the examining continuous motor output in response to aspectual and 
contextual differences. These data show that context descriptions of the location of an 
ongoing action interact with verbal aspect to differentially influence processing of 
these sentences. 
 Despite the promise of these findings, more research is needed to fully 
understand the processing of verbal aspect.  For example, these results do not speak to 
the processing of action verbs that do not explicitly code a destination. Also, our 
results do not shed light on the processing of perfect sentences (e.g., John has closed 
the door).  However, recent empirical evidence suggests that perfect and imperfective 
sentences are processed differently, producing systematic differences in motor output 
(Bergen & Wheeler, 2010). Using the Action Compatibility Effect methodology 
(Glenberg & Kashchak, 2002), the authors demonstrate that imperfective sentences 
about hand motions facilitate and speed manual responses to those sentences, while 
perfect sentences do not.  These data suggest that perfect sentences do not emphasize 
the ongoing action of the verb and are not processed in the same way as imperfective 
sentences are.   
Another outstanding issue is the exact raw time course of processing different 
aspectual forms. As reported in our experiments here and from reaction time 
experiments (Madden & Zwaan, 2003), the exact time course of verbal aspect is 
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elusive because the continuous or progressive aspectual forms indicate an action that 
is ongoing.  As such, perceptual simulations corresponding to the diffuse number of 
alternatives corresponding to this ongoing action may be difficult to capture in raw 
time.  Future research may need to employ other methodologies, such as eye-tracking, 
to more thoroughly understand the time course of comprehending imperfective verbal 
aspect. For example, mouse-tracking is not as immediate as the eye-tracking, typically 
lagging a few hundred milliseconds behind an eye-movement. Therefore, eye-tracking 
provides more immediate information about intermediate stages of processing. 
The current research has implications for several areas of research.  First, 
grammatical aspect has been considered to provide minimal or secondary semantic 
information.  Critically, however, our results indicate that aspect can significantly 
influence on-line processing. Second, this work also investigates grammatical aspect 
using a novel approach, allowing for the examination of more fine-grained temporal 
information, which complements the existing reaction time data. Finally, our results 
provide evidence to support cognitive linguists’ claims regarding meaning as a 
conceptualization of linguistic descriptions, and the idea that aspect, like many 
domains of language, involves dynamic conceptualization (Langacker, 1987: Talmy, 
2000).   
More broadly, this work resonates with embodied cognition work on 
perceptual simulation and language understanding (Barsalou, 1999). It dovetails with 
the methodological advances of Balota and Abrams (1995) by providing new evidence 
from the temporal dynamics of a response after the response has been initiated, and by 
demonstrating that the motor system is not a robot-like automaton triggered by 
completed cognitive processes.  Rather, motor processes are co-extensive with 
cognitive processes during perceptual/cognitive tasks (e.g., Balota & Abrams, 1995; 
Gold & Shadlen, 2000; Spivey et al., 2005). This work also comports with our 
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understanding of how mental models and visual information are coordinated in motor 
output.  Similar to the way understanding spatial events is created and observed 
through tracking eye movements (Richardson & Matlock, 2007; Spivey & Geng, 
2001), this work demonstrates that event understanding takes place differently as a 
function of changes in verbal aspect.  Finally, this work explores a new way that 
language may influence thought in real time.  Specifically, our results suggest that 
differences in underlying perceptual simulations, resulting from these differences in 
the dynamics of a motor response, may account for observed processing differences in 
comprehending sentences that employ different verbal aspects.  
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CHAPTER 5 
CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSION 
 
Taken together the previous chapters provide support for embodied cognition, and 
taken individually, each contributes to different specific areas of research. Chapter 2 
contributes to language-action interactions by summarizing empirical data on such 
interactions and by placing this review of more recent research within a historical 
context of data.  Also, this chapter highlights both the bi-directional relationship 
between language and action, as well as pointing out some of the outstanding 
questions that need to be addressed.  Chapter 3 contributes to children’s sentence 
processing research by examining individual differences within a single age group.  
These results suggest that one of the contributing factors that facilitates the transition 
from child-like to more adult-like use of visual context is linguistic experience. 
Chapter 4 contributes new empirical data to our understanding of verbal aspect.  These 
data show that different aspectual forms differentially influence motor output as a 
result of processing differences associated with the perfective and imperfective forms.  
Further, this work extends our understanding of these processing differences to the 
future tense and to their interaction with contextual information.  While each of the 
preceding chapters makes contributions to individual areas of research, they also as a 
whole make contributions to our understanding of embodied language processing 
more generally.  
 The first such contribution to embodied cognition claims is methodological.  
Chapter 2 introduces the use of mouse-tracking as a continuous motor output index of 
underlying cognitive processing that lends itself readily to investigating embodied 
cognition claims.  Chapter 3 uses this method with a new population of participants, 
specifically young children.  The results reported in Chapter 3 suggest that mouse-
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tracking can reliably be used to investigate the underlying cognitive processing of 
five-year-olds.  Chapter 4 again extends the methodology beyond the two- and three-
forced choice visual scenes used in previous research.  Similarly, these data provide a 
new way of investigating verbal aspect, which has proven difficult to examine 
(Madden & Zwaan, 2003).  Although the diffuse number of perceptual simulations 
corresponding to past progressive sentences have been difficult to detect with reaction 
time tasks, mouse-tracking easily allows researchers to examine their processing and 
how this differs from processing simple past sentences. Using mouse-tracking to 
investigate verbal aspect opens the door to new ways of using mouse-tracking to 
directly index motor output differences in sentence comprehension.   
 The second contribution this dissertation makes is to the theory of embodied 
cognition, especially in Chapters 3 and 4.   Chapter 3 provides evidence that while 
children are not adult-like in their use of visual scene information to disambiguate a 
garden-path sentence, they are adult-like in another way.  Specifically, children show 
the same graded spatial attraction to the incorrect destination, indicating a garden-path 
effect.  The cognitive task of sentence processing leaks immediately into the motor 
output produced by both children and adults.  This implies that even though children 
are not like adults in their use of visual scene information, they are very much like 
adults in the way language immediately influences continuous motor output.  
Similarly, Chapter 4 provides evidence from an area of language processing that 
previously has been difficult to explore.  Capturing processing differences created by 
comprehending sentences containing different aspectual forms has been elusive.  
However, these data suggest that not only do sentence- and word-comprehension 
automatically bleed into motor output, but grammatical aspect does as well.  Hence, 
even at the level subtle temporal information, language comprehension immediately 
influences action. 
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 Despite the contributions of this research, there are still several questions that 
remain. First, there are questions regarding the methodology. Many researchers 
interpret mouse-tracking data as an indicator of graded underlying processing.  
However, is it possible that the cognitive system produces discrete outputs, which the 
motor system then averages to create the continuous trajectories?  Second, there are 
questions regarding the nature of the interaction between language and action.  While 
the new empirical data reported in Chapters 3 and 4 provide evidence for language 
influencing action, they do not speak to whether this interaction is bidirectional.  
Chapter 2 suggests that without evidence for such bi-directional influences, it may be 
possible that cognitive modules are doing the “heavy-lifting” of cognition, and that 
their activity subsequently leaks into the motor areas of the brain.  This description 
suggests that motor and language interactions are trivial. In the remainder of this 
chapter, I will address these two questions individually. 
Methodological concerns 
Researchers using mouse-tracking assume that the graded spatial differences in the 
mouse-movement trajectories index underlying continuous cognitive processing. The 
graded spatial attraction of these hand movements provides evidence both of the 
continuous uptake and integration of visual and linguistic information and of the 
dynamic competition between partially active alternatives made salient by this 
integration (Spivey, Grosjean, & Knoblich, 2005). The continuous mouse-tracking 
results of word identification and sentence processing tasks are taken as support for 
continuous parallel processing in cognition, in a similar way to how eye-tracking 
results provide such support (Magnuson, 2005).   
However, it has recently been suggested that the signature curvatures in these 
mouse-movement trajectories can actually be explained, in principle, by a model in 
which cognitive processing is discrete and serial (considering a single symbolic 
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representation at a time), and the motor output is produced by a continuous parallel 
processing system (van der Wel, Eder, Mitchel, Walsh, & Rosenbaum, 2009). In this 
model, two motor movements corresponding to a strategic upward movement and then 
a perceptual decision movement are asynchronously averaged to produce a smoothly 
curved motor output (Henis & Flash, 1995).  This distinction between perceptual 
processing and action planning provides an existence proof in which motor output 
may be continuous, but the underlying cognitive decisions are serial.  This model then 
creates problems for theories of embodied cognition that propose that cognition is 
dynamically coupled with action.   
It seems unlikely though that one neural system (cognition) behaves in one 
way (i.e., using discrete representations in sequence) and then feeds into a second 
system (action) that behaves in a qualitatively different way (i.e., using continuous 
representations in parallel).  In their reply to van der Wel et al. (2009), Spivey and 
colleagues used the same equations that van der Wel and colleagues (2009) used for 
their model, adding a mechanism of dynamic competition between the multiple 
simultaneous cognitive representations that drive those motor commands (Spivey, 
Dale, Grosjean, & Knoblich, 2010). As there is nothing uniquely serial about the 
equations used by Henis and Flash (1995), the results of Spivey et al.’s model provide 
evidence that the perceptual and motor decisions can both be made in a continuous, 
parallel fashion.  For example, cognitive representations for two response options 
initiate motor commands for both potential reach locations (Cisek and Kalaska, 2005), 
and the averaging weights for those two motor commands start out equal.  This 
instigates motor output that is initially aimed at the midpoint between the two potential 
reach locations.  As one cognitive representation receives increasing perceptual 
support, its weight ramps up, while the weight for the other cognitive representation 
ramps down.  These changing weights are used to produce a dynamically averaged 
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motor movement that smoothly curves in a manner identical to the human data.  
Hence, a dynamic and continuous cognitive task flows smoothly into a dynamic and 
continuous motor output.  
Unanswered theoretical questions 
Does action influence language processing similar to the way language influences 
action? Chapter 2 suggests that it may be possible to reconcile findings that 
demonstrate that language influences action by claiming that language is central.  In 
such an explanation, the activation in language areas spreads to supplementary areas, 
such as motor areas, giving rise to results that look like language influencing action. In 
other words, language could be processed in an encapsulated fashion, and this 
information then spreads into motor output.  This account suggests that the activity 
observed in motor areas during language processing is peripheral and redundant to the 
cognitive task (Mahon & Caramazza, 2008). The empirical results reported in 
Chapters 3 and 4 are vulnerable to this counterargument.  While both children’s 
sentence processing of garden-path sentences and adults’ processing of verbal aspect 
influences motor output, the data reported here do not provide evidence for the bi-
directional influence of action on language.   
 As described in Chapter 2, there is evidence that motor activity influences 
language processing.  These data come from TMS data (Pulvermüller, Hauk, Nikulin, 
& Ilmoniemi, 2005) and from language production research, demonstrating that 
gestures influences language.  For example, speakers continue to use gesture when 
their listener cannot see the gesture (Iverson & Goldin-Meadow, 1998, 2001), 
implying that gestures not only help the listener but also assist the speaker (Goldin-
Meadow & Sandhofer, 1999).  Similarly, when arbitrary movements accompany 
speech, fewer verbal disfluencies are observed when that movement matches the 
implied direction of the speech (Casasanto & Lazaro, 2007), which suggests that 
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action differentially influences language production.  
 There is also evidence that gestures impact children’s cognitive processing.  
For example, gesture seems to aid children’s mathematical problem solving (Goldin-
Meadow, Nusbaum, Kelly, & Wagner, 2001).  More recent evidence shows that 
gestures also reduce cognitive load during the explanation of conservation tasks, even 
when referring to objects that are not present (Ping & Goldin-Meadow, 2010). This 
evidence suggests that action, specifically gestures, facilitates children’s cognitive 
processing by decreasing the cognitive load of such tasks.  Hence, taken with the 
research presented in Chapter 3, the emerging consensus is that the interaction 
between cognition and action is bi-directional, even in children.  
 Similarly, the data presented in Chapter 4 provide evidence that processing 
sentences containing different verbal aspects influences motor output. However, these 
data do not provide any evidence of action influencing the processing of different 
verbal aspects.  As noted earlier, verbal aspect has been difficult to investigate in 
previous research, because imperfective sentences (i.e, David was going to the store) 
imply an on-going action of the verb.  As such, the underlying perceptual simulations 
can correspond to many different stages of incomplete or ongoing action.  Because of 
this, investigations of verbal aspect have been sparse, and at this time, there is no 
empirical data regarding the influence of action on comprehending these types of 
sentences.  
 In order to address this, future work is planned to investigate whether motor 
movements influence the comprehension of verbal aspect.  Specifically, this work will 
perturb the motor output and investigate the impact of these perturbations on the 
comprehension of sentences like those used in Experiment 3 of Chapter 4 (i.e., The 
road to the university was rocky and bumpy.  David was running to the university for 
class). The proposed experiment will again use both past progressive and simple past 
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target sentences, preceded by easy terrain descriptions (The road to the university was 
level and clear) or rough terrain descriptions (The road to the university was rocky 
and bumpy).  Unlike Experiment 3, on half of the trials, the motor output will be 
perturbed as the participant moves the character into the scene.  In order to gauge the 
impact of such motor perturbations, comprehension questions about the sentences will 
follow each trial.  If motor movements influence the processing of these sentences, 
then disrupting the motor output should disrupt language comprehension more when 
the context sentence describes smooth travel than when it describes bumpy travel.  
Also, these perturbations should be least disruptive in the past progressive, difficult 
terrain description.  If perceptual simulations of rough, ongoing actions are created in 
response to this condition, as is suggested by the results obtained in Experiment 3, 
then bumpy motor movements (disrupting the motor output) should be less disruptive 
to comprehending these sentences.  Such differential results would suggest that motor 
output influences processing of sentences containing different aspectual forms and 
would support the hypothesis that language and motor interactions truly are bi-
directional.  
 Even once these questions are addressed, many questions about embodied 
cognition will remain.  First, as mentioned in Chapter 2, embodied cognition cannot 
easily account for the way participants seem to embody depictions of their names on a 
computer screen (Markman & Brendl, 2005).  Second, embodied cognition currently 
cannot explain negation without appealing to logical symbols and rules (Kaup, 
Yaxley, Madden, Zwaan, & Lüdtke, 2006) although strides are being made to account 
for the processing of negated sentences using sensorimotor primitives (Anderson, 
Huette, Matlock, & Spivey, 2010; Kaup, Lüdtke, & Zwaan, 2006).  Third, opponents 
of embodied cognition suggest that conceptual processing of abstract ideas, like 
justice, cannot be explained sufficiently by strong embodied theories (Mahon & 
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Caramazza, 2008).  As such, the research presented in this dissertation makes 
advances to embodied cognition while suggesting the need for future research in order 
to more concretely flesh out the predictions of embodied cognition. 
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